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I. INTRODUCTION
Assuming that either party to a goods transaction has an action for
breach of contract or that the buyer has an action for breach of a war-
ranty that has not been effectively disclaimed under Section 2-316 of
the Uniform Commercial Code,' the aggrieved party's remedial re-
course may be directly and substantially affected by the agreement
between the parties. Section 2-7192 allows the parties wide latitude to
limit or modify the Code's remedial scheme. As a practical matter, it
1. Section 2-316 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
(1) Words or conduct relevant to the creation of an express war-
ranty and words or conduct tending to negate or limit warranty shall be
construed wherever reasonable as consistent with each other, but subject
to the provisions of this Article on parol or extrinsic evidence (Section 2-
202) negation or limitation is inoperative to the extent that such con-
struction is unreasonable.
(2) Subject to subsection (3), to exclude or modify the implied war-
ranty of merchantability or any part of it the language must mention
merchantability and in case of a writing must be conspicuous, and to ex-
clude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclusion must be by
a writing and conspicuous. Language to exclude all implied warranties
of fitness is sufficient if it states, for example, that 'There are no war-
ranties which extend beyond the description on the face hereof."
(3) Notwithstanding subsection (2)
(a) unless the circumstances indicate otherwise, all implied war-
ranties are excluded by expressions like "as is", "with all faults" or
other language which in common understanding calls the buyer's at-
tention to the exclusion of warranties and makes plain that there is no
implied warranty, and
(b) when the buyer before entering into the contract has ex-
amined the goods or the sample or model as fully as he desired or has
refused to examine the goods there is no implied warranty with regard
to defects which an examination ought in the circumstances to have
revealed to him; and
(c) an implied warranty can also be excluded or modified by
course of dealing or course of performance or usage of trade.
(4) Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in accordance
with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or limitation of damages
and on contractual modification of remedy (Sections 2-718 and 2-719).
U.C.C. § 2-316 (1978).
2. Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commerical Code provides:
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is usually the seller rather than the buyer who seeks to take advan-
tage of the opportunity to limit remedies available against him.
Section 2-719 has generated a significant amount of appellate level
litigation in recent years. The provision also has been subjected to
much professional commentary in law reviews and elsewhere. In the
process, the courts and commentators have contributed significantly
to an understanding of this rather ethereal provision. Most impor-
tantly, it should be kept firmly in mind that Section 2-719, like so
many of the provisions of Article Two, "seeks to encourage a method
of lawfinding, rather than dictate a particular result."3 The Section is
more a set of guidelines than a firm rule of law. The text speaks with
the amorphous tongue of "failure of essential purpose" and
"unconscionability" while its Official Comment waxes vaguely with
phrases like "minimum adequate remedies," "fair quantum of rem-
edy," "substantial value of the bargain," and, again, "unconscionabil-
ity." There is much here to cause due trepidation and the opportunity
for error by those who attempt to respond effectively to Section 2-
719's vague dictates. Over a reasonably short period of time the courts
have developed a framework for analysis which provides predictable
results for most questions falling within the ambit of the provision.
However, this sunny picture is clouded somewhat by the question of
the continuing efficacy of a contract provision limiting or excluding
liability for consequential damages under subsection (3). In particu-
lar, the question is whether, once it has been determined under sub-
section (2) that circumstances have caused an exclusive remedy "to
fail of its essential purpose" and "remedy may be had as provided in
this Act," does recovery include consequential damages or, does the
separate damage disclaimer survive to limit or bar liability for conse-
quential loss?
(1) Subject to the provisions of subsection (2) and (3) of this section
and of the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages,
(a) the agreement may provide for remedies in addition to or in
substitution for those provided in this Article and may limit or alter
the measure of damages recoverable under this Article, as by limiting
the buyer's remedies to return of the goods and repayment of the price
or to repair and replacement of non-conforming goods or parts; and
(b) resort to a remedy as provided is optional unless the remedy is
expressly agreed to be exclusive, in which case it is the sole remedy.
(2) Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to
fail of its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act.
(3) Consequential damages may be limited or excluded unless the
limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of consequential
damages for injury to the person in the case of consumer goods is prima
facie unconscionable but limitation of damages where the loss is com-
mercial is not.
Id. § 2-719.
3. Eddy, On the "Essential" Purposes of Limited Remedies: The Metaphysics of
UCC Section 2-719(2), 60 CALIF. L. REV. 28, 29 (1977).
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The structure of Section 2-719 will set that of this article. Part II
will address the standards that a contract provision must meet under
Section 2-719(1) in order to validly limit or modify Code remedies.
Part III will examine the circumstances in which an initially valid
remedy limitation will be found by the courts to have failed under
subsection (2). Part IV will consider the validity of clauses which limit
or exclude consequential damages under subsection (3). The efficacy
of such clauses is often of particular importance because a seller's po-
tential liability for consequential loss may greatly exceed his general
damages or the contract price itself. Under subsection (3), the stan-
dard for judging the efficacy of a contract provision excluding or limit-
ing consequential damages is conscionability. Despite this
particularized standard, a recurring question is whether the "failed of
its essential purpose" standard of subsection (2) fixes the conscion-
ability standard of subsection (3). Special focus will be given to the
question of whether the failure of essential purpose of a remedy limi-
tation exposes the seller to liability for consequential damages despite
a separate provision in the agreement excluding such liability.
II. MODIFICATION OR LIMITATION OF REMEDIES
A. In General
Pursuant to Section 2-719(1), the parties to a sales transaction are
allowed to provide for remedies "in addition to or in substitution for"
the remedies provided by the Code. While subsection (1) anticipates
augmenting remedies, in actual practice parties usually invoke the
provision as a means of limiting the remedies available to the buyer
when the seller breaches the terms of the agreement.
Subsection (1) grants the contracting parties wide latitude to limit
or alter the remedies or damages available to the aggrieved party upon
breach. Particular examples of such limitation are given in the form
of repayment of the purchase price and repair or replacement of de-
fective goods. The purpose is said to be to leave the parties "free to
shape their remedies to their particular requirements" and to give ef-
fect to "reasonable agreements limiting or modifying remedies."4 This
purpose is consistent with a broad Code policy favoring freedom of
contract.5
The parties' right to limit or alter remedies under Section 2-719
4. U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1 (1978).
5. See id. § 1-102(3), which provides:
The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except
as otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not
be disclaimed by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine
the standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be mea-
sured if such standards are not manifestly unreasonable.
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should not be confused with the Code provisions authorizing dis-
claimer of warranties6 and stipulation of liquidated damages. 7 A dis-
claimer of warranty or other liability defines the basic obligation
under the contract. A disclaimer is a liability concept, not a damages
one, and as such is beyond the scope of this article. A stipulation or
liquidation of damages is just that, an agreement as to the dollar
amount of damages that the aggrieved party will receive upon breach.
The validity of such an agreement is governed by Section 2-718(1).
The distinctions are important because the Code establishes quite
different criteria for the validation of warranty disclaimers under Sec-
tion 2-316, for liquidated damage provisions under Section 2-718(1),
and for remedy limitations under Section 2-719. The occasional failure
by courts to properly distinguish between warranty disclaimers and
remedy limitations8 is perhaps due to the fact that the use of either
concept will produce the same result. For instance, with equal effect,
a seller may limit the buyer's remedies under a contract by disclaim-
ing all warranties under Section 2-316 or by limiting the buyer's rem-
edy for breach of warranty to repair and replacement under Section 2-
719. Under either route, the buyer will be precluded from a damage
recovery.9
The confusion between liquidated damage provisions and clauses
which limit or modify remedies is no doubt due to the conceptual
nexus that exists between these kinds of contractual provisions. A liq-
uidated damage provision is by definition a form of remedy limitation.
If a breach occurs which is covered by a liquidated damage provision,
that provision, not Code remedies generally, governs the amount of
recovery. Not only does Section 2-718 provide separate standards for
the validation of liquidated damage provisions, but Section 2-719 spe-
cifically subjects itself to those standards.' 0 Most importantly, a liqui-
dated damage provision, properly construed, is not a risk allocator. It
6. See id. § 2-316.
7. See id. § 2-718(1), which provides:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement
but only at an amount which is reasonable in the light of the anticipated
or actual harm caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and
the inconvenience or nonfeasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate
remedy. A term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as
a penalty.
8. For cases confusing remedy limitations with warranty disclaimers, see Dessert
Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, 248 Ark. 858, 454 S.W.2d 307 (1970); National
Cash Register Co. v. Adell Indus., 57 Mich. App. 413, 225 N.W.2d 785 (1975).
9. J. WmHTE & R. SUmngs, HANDBooK OF THE LAW UNDER THE COMMERCIAL CODE
§ 12-8, at 462 (2d ed. 1980). See Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Waterson, 13 Ark. App.
77, 82-83, 679 S.W.2d 814, 818 (1984).
10. U.C.C. § 2-719 (1978) provides in part: "Subject to the provisions of subsections
(2) and (3) of this section and of the preceding section on liquidation and limita-
tion of damages." (emphasis added).
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is merely an attempt to assess damages which are uncertain in amount
or otherwise difficult to prove. A remedy limitation, on the other
hand, obviously is an allocation of risk. It relieves the breaching party
from some liability for which he would otherwise be responsible and
places the risk thereof on the aggrieved party." The labels used by
the parties, however, are not always determinative. The distinction
should be based on the intent of the parties, on whether an allocation
of risk was the purpose of the provision. For example, the parties may
agree to a sum certain as "liquidated damages," but the amount so
agreed might be so obviously small in comparison to any anticipated
breach that the parties' intent might be reasonably construed to allo-
cate risk rather than to liquidate damages.12
B. Standards for Validation
Subsection (1) of Section 2-719 is in essence a provision governing
the drafting of remedy limitations. It speaks to validation at the time
of the making of the contract, to leaving the parties "free to shape
their remedies to their particular requirements.". 3 It is curious, how-
ever, that no standards are provided for determining the initial valid-
ity of such clauses. Examples of particular remedies are given and
include refund of the purchase price and repair or replacement of non-
conforming goods or parts.14 These stated remedies are thus prima
facie valid and no doubt will be upheld by the courts unless the bar-
gaining context renders their enforcement unconscionable under Sec-
tion 2-302.
Surely, however, some remedy limitations are void ab initio on
their face. Assume the seller expressly warrants its product to be the
standard of the industry, that it will pass with only applause in the
trade and that it is gloriously fit for all the buyer's particular purposes.
Assume further, however, that the contract expressly and conspicu-
ously limits the buyer's remedy in the event the product fails to mea-
sure up to a personally signed letter of apology and condolence on
embossed stationery by the president of the seller corporation. Surely
11. See Dow Coming Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 622 (7th Cir. 1969)(ap-
plying U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(b) to a liquidated damages provision).
12. See Dravo Corp. v. M. L. Barge Operating Corp., 35 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1180 (W.D. Pa. 1982); Lobianco v. Property Protection, Inc., 292 Pa. Super. 346,
437 A.2d 417 (1981). See generally Anderson, Failure of Essential Purpose and
Essential Failure on Purpose A Look at Section 2-719 of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code, 31 Sw. L.J. 759, 761 (1977). For non-Code cases treating clauses labeled
as liquidated damage provisions to be valid risk allocators instead, see Better
Food Markets, Inc. v. American Dist. Tel. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 179, 253 P.2d 10 (1953);
Zurich Ins. Co. v. Kings Indus., 255 Cal. App. 2d 919, 63 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1967);
Vallance & Co. v. De Anda, 595 S.W.2d 587 (Ter. Civ. App. 1980).
13. U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1 (1978).
14. Id. 2-719(1)(a).
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such a silly provision would not be worth the paper on which it is
printed, embossed or not. But to whence does one turn to substantiate
that invalidity? The provision is not an invalid attempt to disclaim an
express warranty under Section 2-316(1) because the warranty still
stands. It is only the remedy for its breach that is in question. Fur-
ther, nothing in the facts would indicate that the provision runs afoul
of that grab bag of loose ends, Section 2-302. Although there is a cer-
tain elegance in an argument that the provision is unconscionable be-
cause the "Cross References" to Section 2-719 do refer to Section 2-
302, a showing of some sort of oppression or unfair surprise is usually
the cornerstone of any claim of unconscionability under the Code.15
Nevertheless there is a nexus between unconscionability under Sec-
tion 2-302 and the minimum standards for a limited remedy under
Section 2-719. These minimum standards lend a particularized exam-
ple to Section 2-302's general concept of unconscionability. A remedy
limitation which leaves a party with too little relief from the conse-
quences of a breach is simply, in Code parlance, unconscionable. This
proposition is manifested not by the text of Section 2-719 but, rather as
is so often the case with this loosely written statute, by the Official
Comment. The tone is set as follows:
However, it is of the very essence of a sales contract that at least minimum
adequate remedies be available. If the parties intend to conclude a contract
for sale within this Article they must accept the legal consequence that there
be at least a fair quantum of remedy for breach of the obligations or duties
outlined in the contract. Thus, any clause purporting to modify or limit the
remedial provisions of this Article in an unconscionable manner is subject to
deletion and in that event the remedies made available by this Article are
applicable as if the stricken clause had never existed.
1 6
A valid remedy limitation, then, must at a minimum provide for "a
fair quantum of remedy." Otherwise it is unconscionable on its face.
The basic fairness of the provision is to be judged in terms of whether
the limited remedy will allow the aggrieved party "the substantial
value of the bargain."17 To return to our silly scenario, the buyer's
bargain was for a virtually flawless good. Clearly, a signed letter of
apology and condolence would not allow him that benefit. The rem-
edy limitation is thus void from the inception of the contract. It was
never "apparently fair and reasonable."ls
To date, there has been virtually no litigation at the appellate level
striking remedy limitations as invalid under Section 2-719(1).
15. Id. § 2-302 comment 1, which states: "The principle is one of the prevention of
oppression and unfair surprise and not of disturbance of allocation of risks be-
cause of superior bargaining power." For a case invalidating remedy limitations
under Section 2-302 on grounds of "trickery," see Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car
Div., 83 N.J. 320, 332-33, 416 A.2d 394, 400-01 (1980).
16. U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1 (1978).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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Whether because of competitive pressures, a sense of fairness, or that
buyers give little coin for letters of apology and condolence, sellers
typically provide for sensible and valuable remedies in the event their
products fail to perform as warranted. In fact, the limited remedies
validated by subsection (1) of refund, repair, or replacement comprise
the vast majority of real-world limited remedies.
However, even remedies given approval by Section 2-719, such as
replacement or refund, may be found invalid if they do not function to
provide the buyer with the substantial value of the bargain or other-
wise fail on unconscionability grounds. For example, a limited remedy
which does not promise repair but merely replacement of defective
parts should be held invalid if such replacement will not function to
repair defects in the goods so as to allow them to perform as
warranted.19
The cases to date that have stricken remedy limitations as invalid
from the inception of the contract usually have done so on the basis of
unconscionability under Section 2-302. For instance, in one case plain-
tiffs recovered $7,500 against a retail drug store and its agent-processor
when defendants lost thirty-two reels of home movie film which the
drug store had agreed to have spliced into a few larger reels. The lan-
guage of a receipt given plaintiffs at the time of contracting provided
that the drug store assumed no responsibility beyond the retail cost of
the film unless otherwise agreed in writing. On appeal, the court up-
held the trial court's decision that the remedy limitation on the receipt
was invalid as unconscionable presumably on the basis that, although
plaintiffs carefully advised the drug store of the importance of the
film to them,20 the drug store manager did not discuss the remedy lim-
itation with plaintiffs nor in any way call it to their attention.21
In a well-known commercial case, the court, by dictum, opined that
a clause which barred any claim for defects in yarn after ten days of
receipt or processing, whichever came first, might be held invalid
under Section 2-719(1). The seller expressly warranted the yarn to be
of merchantable quality, and the goods had a latent shading defect
which rendered the yarn unmerchantable and which reasonably was
19. For a pre-Code case upholding such a provision over vigorous dissent, see Moss v.
Gardner, 228 Ark. 828, 310 S.W.2d 491 (1958). But see Rudd Constr. Equip. Co. v.
Clark Equip. Co., 735 F.2d 974, 979-82 (6th Cir. 1984)(invalidating such a clause
under subsection (2) rather than subsection (1) of Section 2-719).
20. One of the plaintiffs pleaded with the drug store: 'Don't lose this. They are my
life." Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 92 Wash. 2d 40, 42, 593 P.2d 1308, 1310 (1979).
21. Id. at 49, 593 P.2d at 1313. See also Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 83 N.J.
320, 332-33, 416 A.2d 394, 400-01 (1980). Cf Oddo v. General Motors Corp., 22
U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1147, 1148 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977)(it would be uncon-
scionable to enforce against a buyer a manufacturer's warranty/disclaimer/rem-
edy limitation package which was not made part of the dealer's contract of sale
with the buyer).
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discoverable only by processing the yarn.22
In a consumer case, one court demonstrated a different context in
which a limited remedy of refund of the purchase price might be
found invalid at the inception of the contract. Plaintiff had his car
rustproofed by defendant.23 Subsequently, the car rusted through,
and plaintiff sued for damages. The defense was based on a contract
clause allowing defendant the option of repairing the rust damage or
refunding the $79 cost of rustproofing. The trial court allowed dam-
ages of $233. The defendant appealed on the basis of the remedy limi-
tation provision. The defendant also argued that the trial court's
decision was erroneous because there was no separate hearing on the
issue of unconscionability at trial as required by Section 2-302. The
court rejected this latter argument, reasoning that the trial court had
found the limiting clause to be "illusory" rather than "unconsciona-
ble." Although the court did not cite Section 2-719, its basis for af-
firming the finding of invalidity of the clause was that it would in no
way provide the plaintiff with the benefit of his bargain. The plaintiff
would be left in the same position as if he had not paid to have his car
rustproofed.24 The court was saying, in effect, that the remedy limita-
tion did not provide for a "fair quantum" of remedy so as to allow the
buyer "the substantial value of the bargain." Of course, a refund pro-
vision always seeks to return the buyer to the status quo and in no
sense is calculated to allow the value of the bargain. However, refund
provisions specifically are validated by Section 2-719 and thus are an
exception to the benefit of the bargain standard. A refund usually will
return the buyer at least to the status quo. In the rustproofing case,
however, a mere refund of the contract price would have left the
buyer much worse off than he was prior to entering into the contract.
Accordingly, the provision was facially invalid for failure to provide a
"fair quantum of remedy."
Sales of defective or incorrect type seed or herbicide for farming
commonly contain provisions limiting the buyer's remedy to refund of
the purchase price. The courts often strike such provisions as invalid
on grounds of unconscionability or public policy rather than for failure
to provide a minimum adequate remedy under Section 2-719. The un-
conscionability ground usually is used when the remedy limitation
provision has not been carefully communicated to the buyer at the
time of contracting.25 Even absent procedural unconscionability, the
22. Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685
(1968).
23. The contract was thus one for services, but the court apparently overlooked the
fact that it was one to which Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code does
not apply.
24. Kusens v. Bodyguard Rustproofing Co., 23 Ohio Op. 3d 440, 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 530 (Cuyahoga County Ct. App. 1980).
25. Martin v. Joseph Harris Co., 767 F.2d 296, 301 (6th Cir. 1985).
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provision may be held invalid on public policy grounds of protecting a
community of farmers from potential catastrophic losses. 26 Such re-
sults are understandable, particularly in farming states.
C. Exclusivity of the Remedy Limitation
Section 2-719(1)(b) provides that "resort to a remedy as provided is
optional unless the remedy is expressly agreed to be exclusive, in
which case it is the sole remedy."27 Comment 2 apparently requires
that the exclusivity of the limitation be expressed clearly in the agree-
ment. It provides: "Subsection (1)(b) creates a presumption that
clauses prescribing remedies are cumulative rather than exclusive. If
the parties intend the term to describe the sole remedy under the con-
tract, this must be clearly expressed." 28 In short, a remedy limitation
which is not made exclusive is not worth the paper on which it is
printed.29
The one kind of limited remedy to which the exclusivity require-
ment does not apply is a liquidated damage provision. In one case, for
example, the trial court allowed a recovery of actual damages because
the liquidated damage provision was not expressly made the exclusive
remedy by the agreement. The decision was reversed on appeal, the
court holding that Section 2-719(1)(b) was satisfied because "the clear
import is that there shall be no remedy other than the return of the
deposit."3 0 Although the court's result is correct, its conclusion that
subsection (1)(b) can be satisfied by import is unfortunate. The re-
quirement is "expressly agreed." A better basis for the decision would
be that liquidated provisions are governed by the requirements of Sec-
tion 2-718(1), which contains no requirement that the provision be ex-
pressly made exclusive. Further, Section 2-719 states that it is subject
to "the preceding section on liquidation and limitation of damages."31
A valid liquidated damages provision always should be found to be an
exclusive remedy.
26. Dessert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, 248 Ark. 858, 865, 454 S.W.2d 307, 311
(1970).
27. U.C.C. § 2-719(1)(b) (1978).
28. Id. § 2-719 comment 2. See District Concrete Co., v. Bernstein Concrete Corp., 418
A2d 1030, 1036 (D.C. 1980).
29. Cases holding that the exclusivity of a remedy limitation must be expressly stated
include: Northern States Power Co. v. ITT Meyer Indus., 777 F.2d 405 (8th Cir.
1985); Ralston Purina Co. v. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co., 540 F.2d 915 (8th
Cir. 1976); District Concrete Co. v. Bernstein Concrete Corp., 418 A.2d 1030 (D.C.
1980); Richards v. Goerg Boat & Motors, Inc., 179 Ind. App. 102, 384 N.E.2d 1084
(1979); Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 131 N.J. Super. 439, 330 A.2d 384
(1974), rev'd on other grounds, 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181 (1975); Joc Oil USA, Inc. v.
Consolidated Edison Co., 107 Misc. 2d 376, 434 N.Y.S.2d 623 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980);
Leininger v. Sola, 314 N.W.2d 39 (N.D. 1981).
30. Dow Corning Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 1969).
31. U.C.C. § 2-719(1) (1978).
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The courts have evidenced little difficulty in applying the "ex-
pressly agreed to be exclusive" requirement. The only troublesome
question has been the amount of specificity required in the language of
the remedy limitation. Although the answer has varied from case to
case and court to court, the general rule requires a high threshold of
clarity with respect to the exclusivity of agreed remedies. 32 Neverthe-
less, a trend is discernible that more precise language is necessary in
consumer contracts than in commercial contracts.3 3 For example, in
one consumer case the contract provided for an express warranty with
a repair or replacement remedy "in lieu of any other express or im-
plied warranty ... and of any other obligation" on the part of the
seller.3 4 The court construed this language to refer only to "warran-
ties and obligations" rather than to remedies and held that the limita-
tion did not satisfy the exclusivity requirement of Section 2-719.
Accordingly, the buyer could select from the full panorama of Code
remedies.3 - Almost identical language in a commercial contract, how-
ever, was held by another court to be sufficiently specific to meet the
exclusivity requirement.3 6
There is tension between the requirement in Section 2-719 that the
exclusivity of agreed remedies be "expressly agreed" and the general
Code policy of enforcing the "agreement" actially made. Section 2-
719 provides that "the agreement may provide for remedies in addition
to or in substitution for those provided" by the Code. "Agreement" is
defined to mean "the bargain of the parties in fact as found in their
language or by implication from other circumstances including course
of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance."37 On balance,
one would suppose that the quite specific requirement in subsection
(1)(b) that exclusivity of remedies be "expressly agreed" would take
priority over the Code's general concept of "agreement." Neverthe-
32. See Gurney Indus. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 467 F.2d 588,592-93 (4th Cir.
1972).
33. Compare Parsons v. Motor Homes of America, Inc., 465 So. 2d 1285, 1291-92 (Fia.
Dist. Ct. App. 1985)(seller's remedy limitations optional since provision did not
include words "exclusive" or "sole" in consumer sale of motor home) with J.D.
Pavlak, Ltd. v. William Davis Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 1, 3-4, 351 N.E.2d 243, 245-46
(1976)(between commercial parties, language stipulating remedies as "full settle-
ment" is sufficient to meet exclusivity requirement). See also Stream v. Sportscar
Salon, Ltd., 91 Misc. 2d 99, 397 N.Y.S.2d 677 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 1977)(seller in a con-
sumer case was found to have limited "liability" rather than "remedy").
34. Ford Motor Co. v. Reid, 250 Ark. 176, 180, 465 S.W.2d 80, 82 (1971).
35. Id. at 184-85, 465 S.W.2d at 84-85 (1971).
36. Evans Mfg. v. Wolosin, 1 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 193, 193-94 (Pa. Ct. C.P.,
Luzerne Co. 1957). See also Fredonia Broadcasting v. RCA, 481 F.2d 781, 797-99
(5th Cir. 1973)(exclusivity of remedy evident by use of phrase "all" obligations);
Dow Corning Corp. v. Capitol Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 622, 626 (7th Cir. 1969)(the
intent of the commerical parties was clearly to limit remedies even though the
contract spoke in terms of liabilities).
37. U.C.C. § 1-201(3) (1978).
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less, on occasion the courts have been willing to look past the express
language in the contract and consider prior dealings between the par-
ties and the general usage of trade when determining whether an
agreed remedy is exclusive.
In one case, the court held that the course of dealing between tjhe
parties did not demonstrate an intention that the repair and replace-
ment remedy specified in the contract be exclusive 38 On the other
hand, the courts have upheld the exclusivity of a remedy limitation
when the seller could show a general trade usage in the industry rec-
ognizing the exclusivity of a particular remedy. A number of cases
involving photographic film illustrate this view.3 9 In one case, for ex-
ample, the court held that the buyers were limited to replacement of
defective film because of an industry-wide recognition that this rem-
edy limitation accompanied all film sales.40 Nevertheless, such cases
are in the teeth of the specific wording of subsection (2)(b). Sellers
are best advised to rely on prior dealings and trade usage as a last re-
sort and to draft limitations on remedies so as to clearly provide for
their exclusivity.41
Even in cases in which a seller expressly provides that the agreed
remedy is exclusive, the remedy limitation still may fail under Section
2-719(1) (b) if the language does not tie into all breaches or is otherwise
too specific. For example, in one case the court found that the exclu-
sive remedy only applied to express warranties set out in the contract
and not to other obligations thereunder. The contract contained a spe-
cific express warranty and then provided that the seller's "obligation
if the equipment does not meet these warranties is limited solely to
correcting the defect or failure, without charge."42 The buyer's action
was for breach of an implied warranty, and the court upheld the
buyer's argument that the limited remedy was exclusive only with re-
gard to breach of the express warranty.43 The buyer was thus held
entitled to all applicable remedies provided by the Code.
38. Richards v. Goerg Boat & Motors, Inc., 179 Ind. App. 102, 122, 384 N.E.2d 1084,
1097 (1979).
39. See Marion Audiovisual Prods., Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 487 F. Supp. 371, 375
(N.D. Ohio 1980); Posttapes Assoc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 450 F. Supp. 407, 409-10
(E.D. Pa. 1978). But see Herbstman v. Eastman Kodak Co., 131 N.J. Super. 439,
445-46, 330 A.2d 384, 387-88 (1974)(while trade usage was a factor in limiting war-
ranties, the court refused to consider it as limiting remedies), rev'd on other
groun&, 68 N.J. 1, 342 A.2d 181 (1975).
40. Posttapes Assoc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 450 F. Supp. 407, 409-10 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
41. For the view that the seller has a "stiff burden to prove a trade usage as a substi-
tute for 'exclusive remedy' language in the contract," see B. CLARK & C. SmIrrH,
THE LAW OF PRODUCT WARRANTIES T 8.04(1)(b) (1984).
42. National Cash Register Co. v. Adell Indus., 57 Mich. App. 413, 417, 225 N.W.2d
785, 786 (1975).
43. I at 417-18, 225 N.W.2d at 786 (1975). See also Gramling v. Baltz, 253 Ark. 361,
485 S.W.2d 183, denying rehg to, 253 Ark. 352, 485 S.W.2d 183 (Ark. 1972).
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In other cases, courts have found that the exclusivity language was
too specific. A seller must state that the exclusive remedy applies to
all breaches, not just to those attributable to certain defects." For
example, a provision that stipulates repair and replacement as the sole
remedy for defects in material and workmanship may not be sufficient
to prevent a buyer from successfully arguing that the parties did not
expressly state that repair and replacement was the sole remedy in
the case of design defects.45 Thus, a prudent seller will draft his war-
ranty disclaimers and remedy limitations separately so that the rem-
edy is clearly stated to be exclusive with respect to all breaches of
warranty, express or implied.46
D. Conspicuousness
The courts have split on the question of whether the lack of con-
spicuousness of the remedy limitation in the written contract will
render the limitation invalid. Section 2-719, unlike Section 2-316 on
warranty disclaimers, contains no requirement that the remedy limi-
tation be conspicuous. Several courts have relied upon this lack of
specific requirement in Section 2-719 and have upheld remedy limita-
tions which were not conspicuously stated.47
Although the fact that the limitation was not conspicuous in and of
itself should not render it unconscionable under Section 2-302,48 this
44. See S-C Indus. v. American Hydroponics Sys., Inc., 468 F.2d 852, 855 (5th Cir.
1972); Falcon Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Sys., Inc., 300 A.2d 231, 238-39 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1972).
45. See Falcon Tankers, Inc. v. Litton Systems, Inc., 300 A.2d 231, 238-39 (Del. Super.
Ct. 1972).
46. The nexus between disclaimers of warranties and limitations of remedies is illus-
trated by the pitfalls encountered by the seller when the two provisions overlap
in a contract. The seller will be better able to argue that the parties expressly
agreed that the remedy was to be exclusive if the remedy limitation and warranty
disclaimer clauses are kept separate in the contract. See B. CLARK & C. SmITH,
supra note 41, 8.06. In addition, the formal requirements of Section 2-316 re-
garding conspicuousness of warranty disclaimers is not a requirement of Section
2-719. See Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 786-87 (E.D.
Wis. 1982); A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 482-83, 186
Cal. Rptr. 114, 119 (Cal. Ct. App. 1982).
47. Office Supply Co. v. Basic/Four Corp., 538 F. Supp. 776, 786-87 (E.D. Wis. 1982);
Argo Welded Prod. v. J. T. Ryerson Steel & Sons, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 583, 591-92
(E.D. Pa. 1981); Gramling v. Baltz, 253 Ark. 361, 361-62, 485 S.W.2d 183, 189-90,
denying reh'g to, 253 Ark. 352,485 S.W.2d 183 (1972); A & M Produce Co. v. FMC
Corp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 473, 482-83, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 119 (1982); Hahn v. Ford
Motor Co., 434 N.E.2d 943, 948 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); Xerox Corp. v. Hawkes, 124
N.H. 610, 618-19, 475 A.2d 7, 11 (1984); Collins Radio Co. v. Bell, 623 P.2d 1039,
1051 (Okla. Ct. App. 1980); Lobianco v. Property Protection, Inc., 292 Pa. Super.
346, 353-54, 437 A.2d 417, 421 (1981); Flintkote Co. v. W. W. Wilkinson, Inc., 220
Va. 564, 568-69, 260 S.E.2d 229, 231-32 (1979).
48. ANMF Inc. v. Computer Automation, Inc., 573 F. Supp. 924, 928-30 (S.D. Ohio
1983).
LIMITATIONS ON REMEDIES
fact should be regarded as an important consideration in the overall
unconscionability mix. 49 If the limitation is not conspicuous and there
is no showing that the provision was specifically negotiated with the
buyer, nor any other reason why the buyer knew or should have
known of the provision, a strong case can be made that the provision is
unconscionable if its enforcement will substantially restrict remedies
otherwise available to the buyer. A fundamental premise of Section 2-
302 is to avoid oppression and unfair surprise5 0 in the bargaining con-
text. An occasional case has followed this reasoning and invalidated a
remedy limitation, not under Section 2-719, but under Section 2-302.51
Other cases have invalidated inconspicuous remedy limitations under
Section 2-719. Although the courts provide little analysis, the reason-
ing seems to be that, if a warranty disclaimer must be conspicuously
stated in the writing, then an attempt to restrict the remedies avail-
able for breach of warranty also must be.52 Although these results are
understandable, they are in the teeth of Section 2-316 which, after es-
tablishing the requirements for warranty disclaimers, provides in sub-
section (4): "Remedies for breach of warranty can be limited in
accordance with the provisions of this Article on liquidation or limita-
tion of damages and on contractual modification of remedies (Sections
2-718 and 2-719)."53 On the related question of whether a limitation of
remedies available for breach of the implied warranty of
merchantability need mention merchantability as required for dis-
claimers of the warranty by Section 2-316(2), the courts generally have
reasoned under subsection (4) that no such requirement is mandated
by the Code.54
49. See Tacom Boatbuilding Co. v. Delta Fishing Co., 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 26, 37-38 (W.D. Wash. 1980); A & M Produce Co. v. FMC Corp., 135 Cal.
App. 3d 473, 482-83, 186 Cal. Rptr. 114, 119-20 (1982); Frank's Maintenance &
Eng'g, Inc. v. C. A. Roberts Co., 86 IM. App. 3d 980, 989-90, 408 N.E.2d 403, 410
(1980); Mieske v. Bartell Drug Co., 92 Wash. 2d 40, 50, 593 P.2d 1308, 1313 (1979);
Schroeder v. Fageol Motors, Inc., 86 Wash. 2d 256, 544 P.2d 20 (1975).
50. Jensen v. Seigel Mobile Homes Group, 105 Idaho 189, 668 P.2d 65 (1983).
51. See U.C.C. § 2-302 comment 1 (1978).
52. See Orange Motors, Inc. v. Dade County Dairies, Inc., 258 So. 2d 319, 320 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1972); Insurance Co. of North America v. Automatic Sprinkler
Corp. of America, 67 Ohio St. 2d 91, 96-97, 423 N.E.2d 151, 155 (1981); Avenell v.
Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 41 Ohio App. 2d 150, 154-56, 324 N.E.2d 583, 586-87
(1974); Seibel v. Layne & Bowler, Inc., 56 Ore. App. 387, 390-91, 641 P.2d 668, 670-
71 (1982); Walter Baxter Seed Co. v. Rivera, 677 S.W.2d 241, 245 (Tex. Ct. App.
1984).
53. U.C.C. § 2-316(4) (1978).
54. See Orrox Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 389 F. Supp. 441, 445-46 (M.D. Ala. 1975). But
see Dessert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, 248 Ark. 858, 861-62, 454 S.W.2d
307, 309 (1970) (statute required that merchantability be mentioned where writ-
ing purported to modify or exclude implied warranty of merchantability). In ac-
tuality, few cases even address the question, regarding it in effect as a non-issue.
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III. FAILURE OF ESSENTIAL PURPOSE
A. In General/Purpose
The significant majority of cases that have refused to validate at-
tempts by sellers of goods to limit remedies have done so notwith-
standing the fact that the attempt was apparently fair and reasonable
at the inception of the contract. In these cases, the courts found that
subsequent circumstances caused the exclusive remedy "to fail of its
essential purpose." Subsection (2) to Section 2-719 tersely provides:
"Where circumstances cause an exclusive or limited remedy to fail of
its essential purpose, remedy may be had as provided in this Act."
There is no pre-Code analog to this failure of essential purpose
standard, and the drafting history of Section 2-719 offers no guide to
its meaning.5 5 This phraseology, confusing in its vagueness, was ap-
parently calculated to enchant courts into the process of carefully ex-
amining the underlying purpose of the particular remedy limitation in
question by exploring the context of the bargain actually made by the
parties and the particular warranties made by the seller with respect
to the goods. The standard, then, is closely related to the more perva-
sive standards in Article Two of commercial reasonableness and un-
conscionability. Its application requires a careful analysis of the
contract provision in question against the backdrop of the bargaining
phase of the contract and the facts of the case as they developed.
Whatever can be said about the success or failure of the grand de-
sign, the courts appropriately have rejected an overly literal reading of
subsection (2) and usually have refused to apply it out of context with
the facts of the particular case. For example, it has been several years
since the courts have had any difficulty in identifying the purpose
which must fail in order to invalidate an otherwise reasonable remedy
limitation. Sellers no longer can get an appellate level audience for
the ingenuous argument that the sole purpose of the remedy limita-
tion provision was to protect the seller from further liability, that it
was working in that regard just fine, and that it would "fail" only if
the court were to strike it. The courts came to respond to this self-
serving position by observing that it stated only half the case. The
provision limiting remedies must have had a purpose from the buyer's
standpoint as well-a purpose to provide the buyer ultimately with a
"fair quantum of remedy" or "minimum adequate remedies." 56 If this
was not true, the clause would be invalid from its inception under Sec-
tion 2-719(1). In the words of one court:
The purpose of an exclusive remedy of replacement or repair of defective
parts, the presence of which constitute a breach of an express warranty, is to
55. For a brief discussion of the drafting history of Section 2-719, see Eddy, supra
note 3, at 39.
56. See U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1 (1978).
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give the seller an opportunity to make the goods conforming while limiting
the risks to which he is subject by excluding direct and consequential damages
that might otherwise arise. From the point of view of the buyer the purpose
of the exclusive remedy is to give him goods that conform to the contract
within a reasonable time after a defective part'is discovered. When the war-
rantor fails to correct the defect as promised within a reasonable time he is
liable for a breach of that warranty.5 7
Thus, the question is whether performance or attempted perform-
ance of the limited remedy provision has occurred in such a way as to
cause its essential, initial purpose to fail. Such an inquiry "is not con-
cerned with arrangements which were oppressive at their inception,
but rather with the application of an agreement to novel circumstance
not contemplated by the parties."5 8 In seeking a resolution, courts
have been led inexorably to the Official Comments. Comment 1 to
Section 2-719 provides a workable standard that is consistent with
both the aforementioned grand design of contextual analysis and with
the essential purpose of leaving the buyer with a fair quantum of rem-
edy. It states: "[U]nder subsection (2), where an apparently fair and
reasonable clause because of circumstances fails in its purpose or oper-
ates to deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it
must give way to the general remedy provisions of this Article."5 9 In
this way, the courts are encouraged to carefully analyze the factual
occurrences subsequent to contracting in context with both the bar-
gaining process itself and the bargain actually made to determine
whether the subsequent events have operated to deny the buyer the
substantial value of that bargain. If they have, to enforce the remedy
limitation, no matter how carefully it was originally negotiated, would
be to deny to the buyer a fair measure of remedy. Subsection (2) does
not allow this.60
B. In General/Failure
The basic purpose of Section 2-719 is to allow the seller wide lati-
tude in limiting or modifying the Code's remedial structure and at the
same time to guarantee the buyer a fair measure of recourse in the
event of breach. The following commentary succinctly states this
intent:
If the parties intend to conclude a contract for sale within this Article they
must accept the legal consequence that there be at least a fair quantum of
remedy for breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract. Thus,
57. Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 426 (D. Del 1973).
58. 1 N.Y. State Law Revision Comm'n Study of the Uniform Commercial Code 584
(analysis of Professor Honnold).
59. U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1 (1978).
60. An argument by the seller that the buyer actually bargained for an inadequate or
otherwise unfair measure of remedy is also of no avail. Such an agreement would
be invalid under subsection (1) and, perhaps, under Section 2-302 as well. See
supra text accompanying notes 13-26.
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any clause purporting to modify or limit the remedial provisions of this Arti-
cle in an unconscionable manner is subject to deletion .... 61
As the courts apply subsection (2)'s amorphous requirements of "mini-
mum adequate remedy," "fair quantum of remedy," and absence of
"unconscionability," the results reinforce the broad discretion al-
lowed the courts by the failure of essential purpose standard.62 Along
the way, the most careful drafting efforts of the practitioner may be
frustrated because it is quite impossible to draft a contractual provi-
sion that will withstand attack regardless of the machinations of the
parties or of other circumstances which occur subsequent to
contracting.63
The distinction between invalidity ab initio and invalidity as a re-
sult of intervening circumstances is important. If the remedy limita-
tion is invalid from the inception of the contract, it must be so because
of either defects in the bargaining process or because the remedy left
to the buyer does not meet minimum standards. In the former case,
the matter is one of unconscionability under Section 2-302. In the lat-
ter, the provision is substantively invalid under Section 2-719(1). In
either case, the question is one of law for the courts.64 In contrast,
whether or not a valid remedy limitation has failed of its essential pur-
pose under subsection (2) presumably is a question of fact. Although
an occasional case fails to distinguish the point in time at which the
clause became invalid,65 most courts do make the distinction. In such
cases, as will be seen, the courts have demonstrated little difficulty in
determining whether the buyer was left with a minimally adequate
61. U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1 (1978).
62. Representative cases include: Computerized Radiological Servs. v. Syntex Corp.,
595 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 503,267
S.E.2d 919 (1980); Trinkle v. Schumacher Co., 100 Wis. 2d 13, 301 N.W.2d 255
(1980).
63. See J. WHrrE & R. SuMmERs, supra note 9, at 465-66; Anderson, supra note 12, at
763.
64. Indeed, Section 2-302(2) provides: "When it is claimed or appears to the court
that the contract or any clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be
afforded a reasonable opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial set-
ting, purpose and effect to aid the court in making the determination." U.C.C.
§ 2-302(2) (1978). See also Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable &
Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1983)(determination of unconscionability
under Section 2-719(3) is for the court). See generally Select Pork, Inc. v. Bab-
cock Service, Inc., 640 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1981)(despite court's finding of uncon-
scionability at time of contracting, the court based its holding on the failure of
essential purpose of the limited remedy); Computerized Radiological Servs. v.
Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D.N.Y. 1984) (separate analysis of Section 2-
302 unconscionability and Section 2-719(2) failure of essential purpose). See also
J. WirTE & R. SUMMERs, supra note 9, at 465-68; Anderson, supra note 12, at 765;
Eddy, supra note 3, at 38.
65. See Select Pork, Inc. v. Babcock Swine, Inc., 640 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1981); Majors v.
Kalo Laboratories, 407 F. Supp. 20 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
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remedy66 or with the substantial value of his bargain. 67
These subsection (2) cases can be divided into two categories. The
first involves situations in which the goods manifest latent defects sub-
sequent to their acceptance by the buyer. The second involves limited
remedies of repair or replacement of defective goods when the seller is
unable or unwilling to perform his obligation under the remedy limi-
tation provision.
C. Latent Defects: Wilson Trading
One of the early cases to give a detailed analysis to the failure of
essential purpose standard involved the occurrence or manifestation
of latent defects in the goods subsequent to contracting. In Wilson
Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson Lt,68 the New York Court of Ap-
peals held invalid a remedy limitation clause because a latent defect
caused the provision to fail of its essential purpose. The seller sold the
buyer a quantity of yarn for processing into sweaters. After washing,
the sweaters evidenced a "shading" defect which the buyer argued
rendered them unmarketable. Upon non-payment for the yarn by the
buyer, the seller sued for the price, and the buyer counterclaimed for
damages. Although the contract specifically warranted delivery of
good merchantable yarn, the seller defended on the ground that the
contract further provided that "no claims relating to... shade shall be
allowed if made after weaving, knitting, or processing." On the basis
of this provision, the trial court granted the seller summary judgment
for the price. The appellate division affirmed. The New York of
Court of Appeals, however, reversed and remanded. The court rea-
soned that a factual issue was raised as to whether the defects were
reasonably discoverable before the yarn was knitted and processed
into sweaters. If they were not, the remedy limitation failed of its es-
sential purpose "and the buyer is, in effect, without remedy."6 9
The court apparently was persuaded that the remedy limitation
provision was valid at the time of contracting because the court ex-
pressly declined to invalidate the provision under Section 2-719(1).
The provision would remain valid unless and until something occurred
that would impose upon the buyer a risk that the seller should as-
sume. If the remedy limitation provision would place such a risk on
66. See Computerized Radiological Servs. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495
(E.D.N.Y. 1984); Polycon Indus. v. Hercules, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1316, 1325 (E.D.
Wis. 1979).
67. See Consolidated Data Terminals v. Applied Digital Data Sys., 708 F.2d 385 (9th
Cir. 1983). See also Fibematics, Inc. v. Web Sys., 34 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan)
1600 (E.D. Pa. 1982); Kohlenberger, Inc. v. Tyson's Foods, Inc., 256 Ark. 584, 510
S.W.2d 555 (1974); Clark v. International Harvester Co., 99 Idaho 326, 581 P.2d 784
(1978).
68. 23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1968).
69. IM. at 405, 244 N.E.2d at 688, 297 N.Y.S.2d at 113 (1968).
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the buyer, it would not be acting properly as a risk allocator and
should not be enforced. In terms of the text to Section 2-719, circum-
stances caused the provision "to fail of its essential purpose"; in terms
of the Official Comment thereto, enforcement of the clause would de-
prive the buyer of the substantial value of the bargain by imposing on
the buyer a risk which the seller should bear.
In Wilson Trading the seller expressly assumed the risk of latent
defects in the yarn by warranting in the contract delivery of good mer-
chantable yarn. Without this warranty, the limitation provision prob-
ably would have been construed to allocate to the buyer the risk of
latent defects discovered subsequent to processing. Although argua-
bly the warranty fell short of an allocation to the seller of all latent
defects, courts commonly have left the risk of such defects with sellers
when the contract does not provide otherwise, or is ambiguous.70
Under the court's reasoning in Wilson Trading, it was not until the
discovery of the latent defect subsequent to contracting that the valid-
ity of the remedy limitation provision properly could be called into
question. If the defects were not latent, but were reasonably discover-
able by the buyer prior to knitting and processing, the court made
clear that the remedy limitation provision would remain valid. Fur-
ther, only if the defect was material so as to render the sweaters un-
merchantable would the buyer be allowed to prevail. Only then would
the buyer be deprived of the substantial value of his bargain.
Whether or not one agrees with the court's reasoning, the Wilson
Trading decision is one of the few cases to date which has given the
failure of essential purpose standard in Section 2-719(2) an interpreta-
tion which might be applied beyond the particular facts before the
court. Commentators have suggested that the court should have rea-
soned that the clause was invalid from the time of contracting either
70. A famous case on point is Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11
N.Y.2d 5, 181 N.E.2d 399, 226 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962). Cf County Asphalt, Inc. v.
Lewis Welding & Eng'g Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300, 1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (the court
observed that contracts between commercial entities are virtually never held to
be unconscionable absent latent defect), aff'd on other grounds, 444 F.2d 372 (2d
Cir. 1970), cert denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971). But cf. Major v. Kalo Laboratories,
407 F. Supp. 20, 23 (M.D. Ala. 1975)(exclusion held unconscionable despite ex-
press limitation on consequential damages); Cyclops Corp. v. Home Ins. Co., 389
F. Supp. 476, 479-80 (W.D. Pa. 1975)(explicit exclusion regarding consequential
damages found valid); Cornelh Seed Co. v. Ferguson, 64 So. 2d 162, 164 (Fla.
1953)(explicit disclaimer held to be no defense). See generally Neville Chemical
Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Pa. 1968), vacated in part, 422
F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1968), cert denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Dessert Seed Co. v.
Drew Farmers Supply, 248 Ark. 858,454 S.W.2d 307 (1970); Granite Worsted Mills
v. Aaronson Cowen, Ltd., 29 A.D.2d 303, 287 N.Y.S.2d 765 (1968); Jessel & Di
Iuglio v. Lockwood Textile Corp., 276 A.D. 378, 95 N.Y.S.2d 77 (1950); Kansas City
Wholesale Grocery v. Webber Packing Corp., 93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937).
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under Section 2-719(1) or as unconscionable under Section 2-302.71
Further, the concurring opinion suggested that the clause should have
been invalid as a manifestly unreasonable time limitation provision
under Section 1-204.72 Although there is merit to this criticism, the
court in Wilson Trading expressly refused to follow these lines of
analysis, apparently to emphasize that Section 2-719(2) applies to situ-
ations involving occurrences subsequent to contracting that were un-
anticipated by the parties. In this sense, subsection (2) is more akin to
the Code's general excuse provision in Section 2-615 than it is to the
unconscionability provision of Section 2-302. It is more concerned
with the events subsequent to contracting than with the contracting
process itself.
This is not to say that the process of contracting is irrelevant to a
Section 2-719(2) decision. Whether or not subsequent circumstances
will cause a remedy limitation to operate so as to deprive the buyer of
the substantial value of the bargain can be determined only in terms
of the bargain actually made by the parties. If the buyer agreed to
assume the risk of latent defects in the goods, then the subsequent
appearance of such defects in no way would undermine the bargain
actually made. For example, in one case the court enforced a remedy
limitation provision on the basis that the buyer had indeed assumed
the risk of latent defects. The contract involved the sale of herbicide.
The court emphasized the experimental nature of the product in-
volved and the inability to ascertain in advance its effect on a farmer's
crop. In such circumstances, it was not unreasonable, much less un-
conscionable, for the risk of latent defects to be allocated to the
buyer.73
Similarly, courts have upheld risk allocations to the buyer when
the defect was not truly latent. For example, in one case the seller
sold steel roof panels to the buyer, a construction firm. The buyer
installed the panels in a customer's building. Some time later, the roof
began to leak. The court concluded that the leak did not result from a
latent defect but indicated that its conclusion upholding the remedy
limitation provision would have been otherwise had the defect been
71. See B. CLARK & C. StilTr, supra note 41, 8.04(3)(a); J. WHrTE & 1M SuMMERS,
supra note 9, at 468; Anderson, supra note 12, at 765; Eddy, supra note 3, at 39-40.
Special Project, Article Two Warranties in Commercial Transactions, 64 CoR-
NELL L. REv. 30, 232-34 (1978).
72. See U.C.C. § 1-204(1) (1978), which provides: 'Whenever this Act requires any
action to be taken within a reasonable time, any time which is not manifestly
unreasonable may be fixed by agreement."
73. Kleven v. Geigy Agric. Chem., 303 Minn. 320, 329, 227 N.W.2d 566, 572 (1975). See
also Feeders, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 541 (D. Minn.
1981).
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latent.74 Wilson Trading, of course, is distinguishable from these
cases because the express warranty of merchantability specifically al-
located to the seller the risk of latent defects which would render the
goods unmerchantable.
The decision in Wilson Trading makes another point of preceden-
tial value for future Section 2-719(2) cases. Although by its terms the
subsection deals only with a clause providing for limited remedies, the
court interpreted it to apply to a contract term placing a general limi-
tation on the availability of remedies. There was no "exclusive or lim-
ited remedy" in Wilson Trading "to fail of its essential purpose" in
the sense of a repair or replacement or refund remedy. The clause in
Wilson Trading was merely a general time limitation provision which
restricted not the availability of the remedies themselves but the time
during which they could be asserted. The Code does not speak di-
rectly to such provisions except where it can be determined from the
time of contracting that they were either manifestly unreasonable 75 or
unconscionable. 76 Nor was the clause in Wilson Trading a disclaimer
of liability subject to the standards of Section 2-316 or an attempt to
liquidate damages subject to the standards of Section 2-718(1). It was
merely an attempt to place a limitation on remedies, albeit not a lim-
ited remedy per se. The court in Wilson Trading determined that the
clause was not invalid ab initio under these various Code provisions,
but was rendered so by the unanticipated subsequent occurrence of a
latent defect in the goods. The decision in Wilson Trading instructs
that the requirements of Section 2-719(2) will be assessed against any
contractual provision which curtails or alters a party's recourse to the
remedial structure of Article Two.
Regardless of how one views the court's analysis in Wilson Trad-
ing, it is worth careful reading. The court emphasized the numerous
ways under the Code that a clause placing a limitation on a buyer's
remedies can be attacked. Most importantly, after selecting Section 2-
719(2) from among these alternatives, the court did not attempt to
track the rather metaphysical language of "failure of essential pur-
pose." Instead the court emphasized that the provision should not be
allowed to operate to deprive the buyer of the substantial value of the
bargain. By resurrecting this substantial value test from the Official
Comment and by down playing the obtuse language of failure of essen-
tial purpose, the court provided a clear focus for subsequent cases
dealing with Section 2-719(2).
74. Atlantic Bldg. Sys. v. Alley Constr. Corp., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1414,
1417-18 (D. Mass. 1981).
75. U.C.C. § 1-204 (1978).
76. See id. § 2-302.
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1. Other Cases
Other courts have followed the Wilson Trading analysis with re-
gard to latent defects. For example, in one case the seller sold fabric
to a buyer for manufacture into roman shades. The seller expressly
warranted that the fabric was suitable for that purpose. Nevertheless,
the invoice provided that positively no claims were allowed after goods
were cut. The fabric subsequently was found to be defective in that it
could not be fabricated into roman shades. At trial, the court found
that the limitation provision was not unconscionable. On appeal, the
court overruled the trial court's finding, emphasizing that the defect
in the material was latent and not reasonably discoverable prior to
cutting.77 The court referred to the Official Comment to Section 2-719
which states that "there must be at least a fair quantum of remedy for
breach of the obligations or duties outlined in the contract."78 The
express warranty by the seller allocated to the seller the risk of latent
defects in the goods that would render them unsuitable for the buyer's
purpose. The buyer thus was promised a bargain of goods free from
such defects. When the latent defects subsequently appeared in the
goods rendering them unsuitable, application of the seller's clause bar-
ring claims subsequent to cutting would cause the clause to operate to
deprive the buyer of the substantial value of its bargain. Accordingly,
the clause failed of its essential purpose under Section 2-719(2).
In another interesting case, the court found limitation clauses inva-
lid both from the time of the making of the contract and because of
subsequent circumstances. The buyer had been purchasing for several
years a product known as resin former oil, which had been given the
grade or designation "U-171." The product had been developed to
meet the buyer's particular requirements for production of resins for
sales to its customers, who in turn used the resins in the manufacture
of various products, including floor tiles, shoe soles, and paper coat-
ings. The contract barred claims by the buyer made more than fifteen
days after delivery, disclaimed all liability for results obtained from
the use of the product in the manufacturing process, and limited the
buyer's remedy for defects in the product exclusively to a return of
the purchase price. Performance under the contract proceeded for
several years without event. Then, for some unexplained reason, the
seller, without advising the buyer, changed its manufacturing process
for the resin former oil so as to allow a contaminant known as "ethyl
acrylate" into the product. Soon thereafter the buyer began receiving
numerous complaints from its customers that the products made from
the resins prepared with U-171 had begun to emit a persistent and in-
tolerable odor and, in many cases, had to be destroyed. The buyer
77. Trinkle v. Schumacher Co., 100 Wis. 2d 13, 301 N.W.2d 255 (1980).
78. U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1 (1978).
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brought an action primarily for consequential damages. The court
reasoned that the occurrence of latent defects, those "not discoverable
by ordinary inspection and testing," rendered the time limitation
clause manifestly unreasonable under Section 1-204 of the Code and
caused the exclusive remedy of return of the purchase price to fail of
its essential purpose under Section 2-719(2).79
Although the court's result is unquestionably correct, it is difficult
to agree with the court's reasoning that the time limitation provision
was manifestly unreasonable at the time of the making of the contract.
It appears that the risk of losses arising from the latent defects had
been reasonably allocated by the contract to the commercial buyer.
The U-171 resin former oil was rather experimental in nature and was
geared to the buyer's particular resin requirements. Therefore, the
contract provided that: "Buyer assumes all risk and liability for the
results obtained by the use of the material delivered hereunder in
manufacturing process of Buyer or in combination with other sub-
stances."8 0 Nothing in the reported facts indicated that the allocation
of risk of latent defects to the buyer at the inception of the contract
was in any way unconscionable. The failure of essential purpose or
intervening unconscionability was solely attributable to the fault of
the seller subsequent to contracting in unilaterally changing the pro-
duction process by introducing the contaminant into U-171, thereby
directly causing the buyer's losses.
To enforce the remedy limitation, or the time limitation provision
for that matter, would deprive the buyer of the substantial value of its
bargain. Although under the terms of the contract, the buyer initially
accepted the risk of losses arising from latent defects, the buyer did so
only on the basis of known facts and with the presumption that the
seller would not actively engage in a course of conduct calculated to
cause injury. When that presumption failed, the clause on which the
acceptance was based failed with it. The seller caused, and only the
seller could have avoided, the losses in question. Thus, the risk was
properly placed notwithstanding the express terms of the contract.
Other latent defect cases might be analyzed with the decisions dis-
cussed in those sections of this chapter which deal with the failure of
remedy limitation provisions caused by the seller's inability to honor a
limited repair or replacement remedy. Such a case, for example,
would be one in which the seller limits the remedy exclusively to re-
pair or replacement of defective parts and the goods entirely self de-
struct as a result of a latent defect. An analogous situation occurred in
a case involving the sale of panels for installation in an air traffic con-
79. Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649, 655 (W.D. Pa.
1968), vacated in part, 422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1968), cert denied, 400 U.S. 826
(1970).
80. Id. at 654.
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trol tower. The seller limited the remedy exclusively to replacement.
Serious latent defects became apparent in the panels subsequent to
installation. The court held that the replacement remedy had failed of
its essential purpose because the seller was no longer able to correct
the defects by replacing the panels once they had been installed in the
tower.8 '
2. Unconscioncbility
Remedy limitation provisions in latent defect cases can be held to
be invalid from the inception of the contract either because of defects
in the bargaining process (procedural unconscionability) or because
the provision is invalid per se as violative of public policy (substantive
unconscionability). Many cases have been analyzed in these ways.8 2
For example, the New York Court of Appeals opined in Wilson Trad-
ing that its decision might have been reached by holding the limitation
on remedies to be invalid under Section 2-719(1). Presumably, the
court meant the provision could be found not to have allowed a fair
quantum of remedy to protect the substantial value of the bargain.
The seller had given an unlimited express warranty of good merchant-
able yarn. To allow the seller to make a blanket express warranty in
one clause of the contract and then to substantially restrict that war-
ranty by limiting remedies to defects discovered within ten days or
prior to processing would be unconscionable. In this sense, the court's
analysis would be yet another example of judicial disfavor toward al-
lowing contracting parties "to give in the big print and take away in
the small."
Procedural unconscionability can be found for failure to disclose
knowledge of the potential of latent defects in the goods sold. One
such case involved the sale of bacterial soybean inoculant. The manu-
facturer was aware that the inoculant was quite experimental, involv-
ing a freeze-drying process to preserve the bacteria in a live state. The
buyer, a farmer, would have had no means of ascertaining that the
product was defective prior to using it. Nevertheless, the manufac-
turer sought to limit its liability for failure of the product to a refund
of the purchase price. The product failed, and the buyer's crop failed
along with it. The court struck the remedy limitation provision and
allowed the buyer a full recovery for his crop loss.83 On one level the
81. Coastal Modular Corp. v. Laminators, Inc., 635 F.2d 1102, 1106-07 (4th Cir.
1980)(the court also indicated, however, that the limitation, on its face, did not
necessarily exclude consequential damages). See also Earl M. Jorgenson Co. v.
Mark Constr. Inc., 56 Haw. 466, 477-80, 540 P.2d 978, 986-88 (1975).
82. Most courts which have refused to allow the seller by contract to insulate himself
from liability in latent defect cases have held the attempt to be unconscionable,
unreasonable, or violative of public policy. See supra note 70.
83. Majors v. Kalo Laboratories, 407 F. Supp. 20, 25 (M.D. Ala. 1975).
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clause failed on grounds of procedural unconscionability because of
the manufacturer's failure to disclose the experimental nature of the
product. It also might be reasoned that the provision was substan-
tively unconscionable, that a provision which seeks to insulate from
liability for latent defects in a product known only to the seller to be
experimental is unconscionable on its face.
By contrast, in another case involving the sale of agricultural her-
bicide, the court upheld a provision limiting the buyer's remedy to a
refund of the purchase price. The court emphasized the experimental
nature of the herbicide and the inability to predict in advance the ef-
fect that it might have on particular crops. Unlike the case above, the
buyer in this case apparently was aware of the experimental nature of
the product and of the risk that it might prove ineffective.8 4
Similarly, in another case the buyer purchased defective commer-
cial motion picture film for use in making a movie. The movie proved
unsatisfactory because of defects in the film. In the ensuing litigation,
the seller defended on the basis of a contractual provision limiting the
buyer's remedy to replacement of the raw stock. The court upheld the
provision, expressly finding it not unconscionable. The court empha-
sized the many different uses to which such film might be put, the
choice of use being with the buyer, and the fact that raw stock insur-
ance was available to the buyer to protect against losses such as those
it had suffered. Most importantly, it was found that a trade usage ex-
isted in the film industry to the effect that replacement of defective
film was the exclusive remedy available against sellers. For all of
these reasons, the buyer fairly could bear the risk of latent defects in
the film, and a remedy limitation provision expressly allocating that
risk to the buyer would not be unconscionable.8 5
Remedy limitation provisions may be invalidated as substantively
unconscionable if they are found to be violative of public policy. This
is a common result in farming states in cases involving latent defects
in seed or other agricultural products. For example, in one case the
seller sold herbicide to a farmer. The contract contained a damage
limitation provision. When the herbicide proved ineffective to control
foxtail, the court allowed the buyer to recover for his full crop loss.
The court found that the damages limitation provision violated the
state's public policy as expressed in a local statute governing the
proper labeling of pesticides. The court also emphasized the inequal-
ity of bargaining power between manufacturers and farmers in con-
84. Kleven v. Geigy Agric. Chem., 303 Minn. 320, 323, 227 N.E.2d 566, 572 (1975). See
generally Feeders, Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 541 (D.
Minn. 1981).
85. Posttape Assoc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 450 F. Supp. 407, 23 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 855 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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tracts for the sale of agricultural products.sS
D. Repair or Replacement Remedy
The significant majority of Section 2-719(2) cases involve situations
in which the seller, after reasonable opportunity, is either unable or
unwilling to honor a contractual commitment to replace defective
parts or otherwise to repair defects in the goods. In the typical case,
the seller, either in addition to or in lieu of other warranties, has ex-
pressly warranted the goods to be free from defects for a stated time
period or amount of usage. This warranty package is then coupled
with an exclusive limited remedy of repair or replacement of defective
parts. The repair or replacement remedy limitation is specifically au-
thorized by Section 2-719(1), and thus, there can be no question as to
the initial validity of the limitation absent a showing of defects in the
bargaining process (fraud, duress, unconscionability, etc.). In the typi-
cal scenario, defects develop in the goods some time after contracting
but before expiration of the warranty. After being allowed reasonable
opportunity to honor the agreed remedy, the seller is either unable or
unwilling to repair or replace the defective parts or otherwise cure the
defects. The buyer then sues for damages and, on occasion, revocation
of acceptance. The seller, of course, defends on the basis of the rem-
edy limitation provision. Assuming the seller had reasonable opportu-
nity to honor the limited remedy, courts have held with regularity
that the exclusive remedy has failed its essential purpose under Sec-
tion 2-719(2). A good statement of the reasoning of the courts in these
cases is as follows:
[To place the purchaser of a defective vehicle incapable of repair in the anom-
alous position of having no actionable claim for relief pursuant to the strict
language of the express warranty and disclaimer therein, because the precise
nature of the defect cannot be determined and the plaintiff cannot identify
any defective part, the replacement of which could remedy the defect, would
be to defeat the very purpose of the warranty which had been given to the
purchaser. Such a result would substantially deprive the buyer of the benefit
of his bargain and is unconscionable. Although the warranty and disclaimer,
which is strictly limited to parts, is not unconscionable on its face, it cannot be
applied to the facts in a conscionable manner.8 7
What is operating in these cases can be labeled "intervening" un-
conscionability. Although the remedy limitation provision may have
been initially valid, being the product of informed bargaining and hav-
ing provided for the buyer a fair quantum remedy, intervening cir-
cumstances, like the failure of the seller to honor the agreed remedy,
have subsequently caused the remedy limitation to operate in an un-
conscionable manner by depriving the buyer of the substantial value
86. Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 315 N.W.2d 696 (S.D. 1982). See also Dessert Seed
Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, 248 Ark. 858, 454 S.W.2d 307 (1970).
87. Eckstein v. Cunmins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 10-11, 321 N.E.2d 897, 904 (1974).
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of the bargain. In this sense, Section 2-719(2) is closely related to Sec-
tion 2-615, the Code's provision for failure of presupposed conditions.
To paraphrase Section 2-615, there has been a nonoccurrence of a con-
dition, the occurrence of which was a basic assumption of the contract.
The buyer, as a fundamental element of the bargain, was promised a
product free from defects, or alternatively, one that could be so ren-
dered by the seller within a reasonable time. From the buyer's per-
spective, the essential purpose of the remedy limitation provision was
to effectuate the alternative part of that guarantee. If repairs are not
forthcoming within a reasonable time, the remedy limitation provision
has failed of its essential purpose. In the words of one commentator:
This rosy picture of the limited repair warranty, however, rests upon at least
three assumptions: that the warrantor will diligently make repairs, that such
repairs will indeed 'cure' the defects, and that consequential loss in the in-
terim will be negligible .... But when one of these assumptions proves false
in a particular case, the purchaser may find that the substantial benefit of the
bargain has been lost.8 8
The Official Comments to Section 2-719 support this intervening un-
conscionability analysis. Comment 1 provides:
Thus any clause purporting to modify or limit the remedial provisions of this
Article in an unconscionable manner is subject to deletion and in that event
the remedies made available by this Article are applicable as if the stricken
clause had never existed. Similarly, under subsection (2), where an appar-
ently fair and reasonable clause because of circumstances fails in its purpose
or operates to deprive either party of the substantial value of the bargain, it
must give way to the general remedy provisions of this Article.8 9
88. Eddy, supra note 3, at 63.
89. U.C.C. 2-719 comment 1 (1978). Typical cases include: Hartzell v. Justus Co., 693
F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1982); Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d
1081 (3d Cir. 1980); Coastal Modular Corp. v. Laminators, Inc., 635 F.2d 1102 (4th
Cir. 1980); AES Technology Sys. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933 (7th Cir.
1978); S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978); Soo Line
R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977); Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442
F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1971); Custom Automated Machs. v. Penda Corp., 537 F. Supp.
77 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Polycon Indus. v. Hercules, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Wis.
1979); Koehring Co. v. A.P.I., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Mich. 1974); Kalil Bot-
tling Co. v. Burroughs Corp., 127 Ariz. 278, 619 P.2d 1055 (Ct. App. 1980); Walker
Ford Sales v. Gaither, 265 Ark. 275, 578 S.W.2d 23 (1979); Morris v. Chevrolet
Motor Div. of General Motors Corp., 39 Cal. App. 3d 917,114 Cal. Rptr. 747 (1974);
Conte v. Dwan Lincoln-Mercury, Inc., 172 Conn. 112, 374 A.2d 144 (1976); J.A.
Jones Constr. Co. v. City of Dover, 372 A.2d 540 (Del. Super. Ct. 1977); Adams v.
J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d, 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970); Carboline Co. v. Oxmoor
Center, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1728 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Ford Motor
Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Jacobs v. Resemount Dodge-
Winnebago South, 310 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1981); Givan v. Mack Truck, Inc., 569
S.W.2d 243 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978); John Deere Co. v. Hand, 211 Neb. 549,319 N.W.2d
434 (1982); Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95 A.D.2d 465, 46
N.Y.S.2d 606 (1983); Richard W. Cooper Agency v. Irwin Yacht & Marine Corp.,
46 N.C. App. 248, 264 S.E.2d 768 (1980); Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc., 47 N.C. App.
503, 267 S.E.2d 919 (1980); Goddard v. General Motors Corp., 60 Ohio St. 2d 41, 396
N.E.2d 761 (1979); Osburn v. Bendix Home Sys., 613 P.2d 445 (Okla. 1980); John-
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Of course, it makes no difference with respect to the question of
failure of essential purpose under Section 2-719(2) whether that fail-
ure resulted from good faith attempts by the seller to cure the defects
or from a calculated unwillingness to do so.90 The focus of subsection
(2) is upon the adequacy of the remedy to the buyer and not upon the
mindset or actions of the seller. Thus, in holding that proof of a lim-
ited remedy's failure of its essential purpose did not require a showing
that the seller's inability to repair was willful, dilatory, or even negli-
gent, one court observed that "the damage to the buyer is the same
whether the seller diligently but unsuccessfully attempts to honor his
promise or acts negligently or in bad faith."91 The court reasoned that
the touchstone was whether the inability or unwillingness to repair or
the delay in repairing deprived the buyer of the substantial benefit of
the bargain. One lesson for sellers is that they should not dismiss
lightly warranty claims by buyers based upon agreed remedies even
though the particular seller may have a good faith belief that the
goods are not defective or that the agreed remedy is not applicable.
For example, in one case, the court found the exclusive remedy had
failed of its essential purpose even though the seller's refusal to repair
was based on a good faith belief that the automobile's odometer had
been turned back and that the warranty had expired.92
It is true that there is an early line of cases ending in the late 1970's
son v. John Deere Co., 306 N.W.2d 231 (S.D. 1981); Ehlers v. Chrysler Motor
Corp., 88 S.D. 612, 226 N.W.2d 157 (1975); Moore v. Howard Pontiac-American,
Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1972)(cert denied).
90. Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1085 (3d Cir. 1980).
See also Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365, 1371 & n.7 (8th Cir.
1977)(failure to repair defect within reasonable time caused exclusive remedy to
fail although no willful or negligent conduct by seller); Custom Automated
Machs. v. Penda Corp., 537 F. Supp. 77,83 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Fargo Mach. &Tool Co.
v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich. 1977)(exclusive remedy
failed of essential purpose when the goods could not be repaired despite seller's
conscientious efforts to correct defects); Durfee v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262
N.W.2d 349, 356 (Minn. 1977); Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95
A.D.2d 5,11,465 N.Y.S.2d 606, 611 (1983)(failure to repair causes failure of exclu-
sive remedy even though no claim of bad faith or willfully dilatory conduct or
negligence); Echstein v. Cummins, 41 Ohio App. 2d 1, 3, 321 N.E.2d 897, 899
(1974)(failure of essential purpose resulted even though dealer made valiant at-
tempts to repair); Moore v. Howard Pontiac-American, Inc., 492 S.W.2d 227, 229
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1972)(failure of exclusive remedy results when seller attempts to
repair but is unsuccessful)(cert. denied). See also Murray v. Holiday Rambler,
Inc., 83 Wis. 2d, 406, 424, 265 N.W.2d 513, 522 (1978)(buyer did not need to show
willfulness by seller to prove failure of essential purpose of exclusive remedy).
But see County Asphalt, Inc. v. Lewis Welding & Eng'g Corp., 323 F. Supp. 1300,
1308 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), off'd on other grounds, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 404 U.S. 939 (1971).
91. Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95 A.D.2d 5,11,465 N.Y.S.2d 606,
611 (1983).
92. Ehlers v. Chrysler Motor Corp., 88 S.D. 612,617-19,226 N.W.2d 157,159-61 (1975).
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which can be read for the proposition that there can be no failure of
essential purpose of a limited remedy provision absent intentional re-
fusal of the seller to perform the agreed remedy or at least negligence
in the performance.93 This line of decisions is probably best under-
stood in the light of the scant precedential authority existing at the
time to guide the courts in interpreting Section 2-719(2). Regardless,
such decisions were then, and are now, just plain wrong. Nothing in
text or commentary under Section 2-719 indicates that a seller's good
faith is to play any part in determining whether an exclusive remedy
has failed. The question is simply whether the agreed remedy can op-
erate to allow the buyer the substantial value of the bargain. Fortu-
nately, there have been no recent cases making failure of essential
purpose under Section 2-719(2) dependent upon the seller's fault.
A good example of typical judicial treatment of failure of the es-
sential purpose of an exclusive repair or replacement remedy involved
a suit by a buyer against the remote manufacturer of a defective bull-
dozer. The applicable contract document, a purchase order, provided
that the manufacturer warranted the bulldozer to be free from defects
in material and workmanship for six months from the date of delivery
and limited the manufacturer's obligation to the repair or replacement
of any defective parts.94 The purchase order further provided that the
warranty was in lieu of all other express or implied warranties and
barred liability for incidental and consequential damages. The court
found that the buyer signed the purchase order "indicating he had
carefully read the instrument and was acquainted with its contents."9 5
The bulldozer evidenced an annoying vibration from the day it was
delivered. The seller's attempts to correct the abnormal vibration
were unsuccessful. The seller did conclude that the problem was
caused by defects in material and workmanship in the manufacture of
the dozer.
After the seller's unsuccessful attempts to repair, the buyer hired a
mechanic, who took apart the equipment and discovered that certain
parts were installed backwards causing the vibration and a corre-
sponding loss in the fair market value of the dozer.96 The buyer re-
fused to make further payments on the purchase price and the seller
93. See American Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435, 453-
54 & n.35 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Koehring Co. v. A.P.I., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 882, 891 (E.D.
Mich. 1974); Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp 39, 43-45
(N.D. Ill. 1970); Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 M1. App. 2d 388, 402,406,261 N.E.2d 1,
7, 9 (1970); Lankford v. Rogers Ford Sales, 478 S.W.2d 248, 251 (Tex. Civ. App.
1972).
94. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Waterson, 13 Ark. App. 77, 80, 679 S.W.2d 814, 816
(1984).
95. Id at 80, 679 S.W.2d at 816-17.
96. The buyer experienced other mechanical problems requiring replacement or re-
pair of a number of engine parts. Id. at 80-81, 679 S.W.2d at 817.
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sued. The buyer then filed a counterclaim against the seller and the
manufacturer.9 7 At trial the manufacturer argued that its written
warranty and remedy limitation were exclusive and limited the buyer
to repair or replacement of defective parts and excluded liability for
other damages. The buyer was awarded damages, including lost prof-
its, and the manufacturer appealed.
The court on appeal carefully addressed the issue of whether the
repair or replacement limitation had failed of its essential purpose.
The court reasoned that Section 2-719(2) might be applicable even
though the remedy limitation was valid at the inception of the con-
tract and even though both parties to the litigation were commercially
sophisticated. The court held:
[Section 85-2-719(2)] is to apply whenever an exclusive remedy, which may
have appeared fair and reasonable at the inception of the contract as a result
of late circumstances operates to deprive a party of a substantial benefit of the
bargain. Where the seller is given reasonable opportunity to correct the de-
fect or defects and the machinery nevertheless fails to operate as should new
machinery free of defects, the limited remedy fails of its essential purpose. It
makes no difference that the transaction was between commercial parties.
We are not dealing with unconscionability or disparity of bargaining power
under the facts of this case, but whether a party was deprived of a substantial
benefit of the bargain. 9 8
The court also looked to the purpose of the remedy limitation and
concluded:
The purpose of an exclusive remedy of replacement or repair of defective
parts is to give the seller an opportunity to make the goods conforming while
limiting the risks to which he is subject by excluding direct and consequential
damages that might arise otherwise. From the point of view of the buyer, the
purpose of the exclusive remedy is to give him goods that conform to the con-
tract within a reasonable time after a defective part is discovered. When the
warrantor fails to correct the defect as promised within a reasonable time, he
is liable for breach of that warranty.9 9
The court ultimately concluded that the remedy limitation failed of its
essential purpose of providing the buyer goods free from defects
within a reasonable time and thereby operated to deprive the buyer of
the substantial value of the bargain.
The great weakness in the court's analysis is that it assumed that
once the exclusive remedy failed the buyer was entitled to recover
damages as provided in Article Two, including consequential damages.
97. The seller and buyer settled their respective claims against each other at trial.
The case continued on the buyer's claim against the manufacturer.
98. Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Waterson, 13 Ark. App. 77, 84, 679 S.W.2d 814, 818-19
(1984).
99. Id at 83, 679 S.W.2d at 818. This language closely tracks that of the court in Beal
v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423, 426 (D. Del. 1973). Beal was the first
case to attempt to define the essential purpose underlying a remedy limitation
agreement between parties. Most courts do not address this issue directly, and
those that do usually do little more than cite Beal. For an exception, see Coastal
Modular Corp. v. Laminators, Inc., 635 F.2d 1102, 1107 (4th Cir. 1980).
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The court did not address the fact that the applicable contract docu-
ment at issue contained express language that barred consequential
damages. Under Section 2-719(3), such language is to be given effect
unless the bar would "operate in an unconscionable manner." 00 The
court's oversight might be attributable to the fact that the seller did
not properly make the argument. The relationship between failure of
essential purpose of a remedy limitation and separate contractual pro-
visions excluding liability for consequential damages is discussed
later.101
The court's analysis nevertheless is instructive because it is one of
the few judicial decisions to predicate its analysis on the purpose of the
remedy limitation provision in question. 0 2 It is also one of the few
decisions to peg its analysis on both litanies, failure of essential pur-
pose and substantial bargain deprivation. Most courts simply use one
peg or the other. One line of decisions tracks the language of the text
of Section 2-719, holding that a remedy limitation has failed of its es-
sential purpose when the seller is unable or unwilling to make neces-
sary repairs within a reasonable time.1 03 Another line turns to the
commentary to the section, holding that when a seller does not make
promised repairs within a reasonable time the buyer has been de-
prived of the substantial value of the bargain.104 Regardless of the
focus, it is clear that a seller's unwillingness or inability to honor,
within a reasonable time, a repair or replacement remedy will cause
the limitation to be stricken and allow the buyer access to other reme-
dies provided by the Code.
E. Seller's Defenses: Reasonable Opportunity
There is little room for a seller to defend an allegation that he has
been unable or unwilling to honor a repair or replacement remedy.
Two avenues appear to be available. One is to argue that he has in-
deed tendered the agreed remedy. The other is to argue that he has
not had a reasonable opportunity to make such a tender.
An example of a successful defense based upon proper tender arose
in a case involving the sale of open cut and jack pipe to be used by the
100. U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 3 (1978).
101. See infra text accompanying notes 115-216.
102. The root case is Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1973).
103. See, e.g., Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081, 1085 (3d Cir.
1980); Coastal Modular Corp. v. Laminators, Inc., 635 F.2d 1101, 1107 (4th Cir.
1980); Carboline Co. v. Oxmoor Center, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1728,
1732-33 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 503, 515, 267
S.E.2d 919, 926 (1980).
104. See Hartzell v. Justus Co., 693 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1982). See, e.g., Polycon Indus. v.
Hercules, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1316, 1325 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v.
Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95 A.D.2d 5, 11, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606, 611 (1983).
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buyer, a construction company, to install underground sewer lines.105
During construction, three separate pipe breaks occurred after the
pipe had been installed in underground tunnels. Each pipe break
caused construction to cease immediately for replacement of the bro-
ken pipe. The seller supplied replacement pipes in each instance, and
the buyer expended $60,000 to repair the breaks. The buyer brought
suit for that amount. The seller defended that the contract limited the
buyer's remedy to above-ground repair and replacement of defective
pipe, a remedy which the seller had honored by supplying replace-
ment pipes. The court held for the seller, finding that below ground
breaks were a foreseeable risk which had been allocated to the buyer
by the remedy limitation provision. The court found that the provi-
sion was a sensible measure taken by the seller to keep the price of the
pipe at a reasonable level.
By supplying replacement pipe above ground, the seller did what it
promised to do, and the remedy limitation provision had not failed.
The court said that Section 2-719(2) was not triggered unless unantici-
pated circumstances rendered the seller unable to provide the agreed
remedy. This was true regardless of whether the remedy turned out
to be no remedy at all. The court did opine that if the pipe breaks
were caused by a latent defect which existed in all the pipes, and if the
replacement pipes were similarly defective, such unanticipated cir-
cumstances would make Section 2-719(2) applicable. The court specu-
lated that the buyer's argument on the instant facts might have been
better based on unconscionability. By this, the court presumably
meant that the risk allocation to the buyer of underground breaks left
no adequate remedy for breaks caused by defects in the pipe not ascer-
tainable by reasonable inspection.10s The court expressly reserved
opinion as to the merits of such a contention.107
The lesson is obvious. If the seller tendered the agreed remedy,
the provision cannot be found to have failed of its essential purpose.
One way the seller can make better use of this defense is by drafting
the agreed remedy more broadly so as to provide a back-up remedy
that can be honored. Such remedies might include refund of the
purchase price, replacement of the contracted goods, or even payment
of liquidated damages. For example, the contract might provide that
the buyer's exclusive remedy will be, at the option of the seller, repair
or replacement of defective parts, replacement of the goods them-
selves, or refund of the purchase price. In the event that the seller
subsequently is unable to repair defects in the goods, one of the alter-
105. Price Bros. Co. v. Charles J. Rogers Constr. Co., 104 Mich. App. 369, 304 N.W.2d
584 (1981).
106. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
107. Price Bros. Co. v. Charles J. Rogers Constr. Co., 104 Mich. App. 369, 304 N.W.2d
584 (1981).
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native remedies might be tendered. If this occurs, the court should
find no failure of essential purpose.10 8
Another line of defense to an allegation under Section 2-719(2) that
a repair or replacement remedy has failed is that the seller was not
allowed a reasonable opportunity to tender the agreed remedy. Nu-
merous decisions under Section 2-719(2) deal with the question of
whether the repair or replacement remedy failed due to delay by the
seller in correcting the defect. It is generally agreed, of course, that an
unreasonable delay will cause the remedy limitation to fail.109 The
courts, however, have not been helpful in defining the parameters of
reasonableness in these cases. The question is of obvious importance
because a corollary to the proposition that a seller must repair within
a reasonable time is that the buyer must give the seller a reasonable
opportunity to make such repair. In this sense, the seller's right to
repair parallels the similar right to cure defects under Section 2-508 in
cases in which the buyer rejects defective goods. The case law examin-
ing the seller's cure right under Section 2-508 might be helpful in de-
termining the reasonableness of his opportunity to repair under
Section 2-719(2).110
Regardless, the question of reasonableness is one for the jury to
determine on the particular facts and circumstances of the individual
case.111 The buyer, however, is not bound to allow the seller an unlim-
ited amount of time in which to correct defects.1 2 It is probably fair
to say that the courts generally have allowed sellers less time for con-
sumer products than for more complex goods sold in a commercial
context.113 The fact that the parties are aware that the goods are of an
experimental nature also may extend the time period for repair.114
108. For cases upholding an alternate refund remedy upon failure of the repair rem-
edy, see Marr Enters. v. Lewis Refrigeration Co., 556 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1977);
Garden State Food Distrib., Inc. v. Sperry Rand Corp., 512 F. Supp. 975 (D.N.J.
1981). But see Earl M. Jorgensen Co. v. Mark Constr., Inc., 56 Haw. 466, 540 P.2d
978 (1975)(refund remedy failed along with repair remedy in latent defect case).
109. See R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1985);
Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); Polycon
Indus., v. Hercules, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Hydraform Prod.
Corp. v. American Steel & Aluminum Corp., 127 N.H. 187, 498 A.2d 339 (1985);
Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 503, 267 S.E.2d 919 (1980).
110. The cases are collected in Uniform Commercial Code Case Digest (Callgahan)
2508.2 (Rev. 1985). Two widely cited cases testing the extent of a seller's cure
rights under Section 2-508 are Wilson v. Scampoli, 228 A.2d 848 (D.C. App. 1967);
Zabriskie Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195 (1968).
111. See Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 265 N.W.2d 513 (1978).
112. American Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 418 F. Supp. 435
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39
(N.D. IMl. 1970); Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970);
Lankford v. Rogers Ford Sales, 478 S.W.2d 248 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972).
113. See B. CLARK & C. SMITH, supra note 41, at 8-55.
114. See Waters v. Massey Ferguson, Inc., 775 F.2d 587 (4th Cir. 1985).
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Most cases will be governed by common sense. Once the buyer
gives the seller an opportunity to repair, the seller must make the at-
tempt. If the seller is unable or unwilling to do so, the exclusive rem-
edy has failed. If the seller tenders repairs, the buyer immediately
should inspect the goods to ascertain that the repairs have been made
properly. If the defects still exist, the buyer should force the seller to
state the further time period needed to correct the defects. Unless the
seller demands an outrageous period, the buyer should acquiesce. The
buyer, after all, has assumed the risk of defective goods for a reason-
able period of time. If the seller refuses to state a reasonable period
necessary to conduct the repairs, this refusal no doubt will weigh
strongly against the seller in subsequent litigation.
The harder cases are those in which the initial repair attempt ap-
pears to have been successful, but the defects manifest themselves
shortly thereafter. In such circumstances, reasonableness almost al-
ways will require that the seller be given another opportunity. No
line of work always achieves perfection and this is certainly true for
repairs of goods. However, absent extraordinary circumstances, two
or three opportunities to repair should stretch the bounds of reasona-
bleness regardless of the nature of the transaction, consumer or
commercial.
IV. REMEDIES AVAILABLE UPON FAILURE OF AN
EXCLUSIVE REMEDY/LIMITATION OR EXCLUSION
OF CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES
A. In General: A Perspective
The most perplexing question under Section 2-719 is what reme-
dies are available to the aggrieved buyer once a remedy limitation pro-
vision has been found to have failed of its essential purpose. Section 2-
719(2) vaguely, but provocatively, provides that "remedy may be had
as provided in this Act." The offending clause is to be stricken and the
panorama of remedies available under Article Two is opened to the
buyer. Certainly these would include, on appropriate facts, the gen-
eral damage remedy for accepted goods in Section 2-714,115 the goods
oriented remedies of revocation of acceptance under Section 2-608,
and, in the rarer case in which the defects arise after contracting but
before acceptance, rejection under Section 2-601.116 In rejection or
revocation cases, of course, the buyer may be entitled to money dam-
315. See Soo Line R.R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977); Walker Ford
Sales v. Gaither, 265 Ark. 275,578 S.W.2d 23 (1979); Givan v. Mack Truck, Inc., 569
S.W.2d 243 (Mo. App. 1978).
116. See Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575 S.W.2d 480 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Jacobs v.
Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago, 310 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1981); McCullough v. Bill
Swad Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 5 Ohio St. 3d 181, 449 N.E.2d 1289 (1983).
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ages as well.117
Recovery also may include consequential damages under Section 2-
715 unless such damages have been properly excluded by the contract.
Apparently, an independent disclaimer of consequential damages is
necessary to protect a seller's liability once an exclusive remedy has
failed of its essential purpose. In those cases in which the contract
provided for a limited remedy but for no separate exclusion of conse-
quential damages, the courts usually have held that such damages are
recoverable once the limited remedy has failed.118 Although this ra-
tionale arguably ignores that the parties may have intended the lim-
ited remedy to perform a dual purpose and that the purpose of
insulating the seller from consequential liability may not necessarily
have failed, the courts take literally the statement in the Official Com-
ment to Section 2-719 that the offending provision is "subject to dele-
tion" from the contract. In the words of one court:
The direct damage remedy of § 2.714(2), therefore, is applicable only when the
exclusive remedy provided in the contract fails of its essential purpose within
the meaning of § 2-719(2). Under that section when such a failure occurs re-
course may be had to all the remedial provisions of the Code. There is no
discernible reason for limiting that recourse to selected remedial provisions as
defendant apparently attempts to do. The direct damages section, § 2-714(2),
has no greater claims to application here than does the consequential damages
section, § 2-714(3), assuming, of course, that this is otherwise 'a proper case'
for consequential damages. 1 1 9
But what if the contract, as is typical, further provides a simple state-
ment that "in no event shall seller be liable for incidental, consequen-
tial, or other special damages incurred or suffered by the buyer" or
words to that effect? What should be the fate of this independent pro-
vision disclaiming liability for consequential damages once a remedy
limitation provision has been found to have failed?
In attempting to answer this question, three general observations
fairly can be made. First, the question is an extremely important one,
probably the most important question raised by Section 2-719 in terms
of practical effect. Second, the question continues to produce a pleth-
ora of appellate level litigation with results all across the board.
Third, most of the analysis, although perhaps not the results, in these
117. See Givan v. Mack Truck, Inc., 569 S.W.2d 243 (Mo. App. 1978); Murrary v. Holi-
day Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 265 N.W.2d 513 (1978).
118. See Coastal Modular Corp. v. Laminators, Inc., 635 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1980); Beal
v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423 (D. Del. 1973); Neville Chem. Co. v.
Union Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Pa. 1968), aff'd in part, rev'd in part,
422 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Reynolds v. Pre-
ferred Mut. Ins. Co., 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 701 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1972).
119. Beal v. General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp. 423,427 (D. Del. 1973). See also Gram-
ling v. Baltz, 263 Ark. 352, 485 S.W.2d 183 (1972)(contract provided that seller's
repair or replacement warranty was "in lieu of" liability for consequential
damages).
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decisions has been unsatisfactory on the whole because the courts
have failed to notice or emphasize that unconscionability under Sec-
tion 2-719(3) is not concerned primarily with events at the time of con-
tracting but, instead, with the circumstances which have occurred
subsequent thereto.
The relative importance of a consequential damages disclaimer in
comparison to a limitation of direct damages is apparent. Certainly a
seller would prefer to restrict the liability entirely to repair or replace-
ment of defective parts, for example, than to risk exposure to the spec-
trum of direct damages remedies provided by Article Two. The
limited remedy provision will allow the seller full control over satisfy-
ing complaints by the buyer and the flexibility to exercise that control
to minimi e effort and expenditure. But there is usually little cause
for concern if the seller loses this protection so long as immunity from
consequential liability remains intact. The buyer then will be able to
recover only direct damages and perhaps to revoke acceptance. In
case of revocation, unless the market price for the goods has risen dra-
matically, the seller risks little more than refunding to the buyer pay-
ments received in exchange for a return of the defective goods. And in
the case of damages for accepted goods, the seller's potential liability
usually will not exceed the purchase price unless the buyer has made
an exceptionally good deal by purchasing the goods at a price much
less than their true value as warranted. In the usual case, then, the
seller will be required to do no more than repay some or all of the
buyer's money. The direct damages game usually is played with the
money of the aggrieved party with the upper end of liability always
being the value of the goods as warranted. The seller risks only frus-
tration of a lost expectation in terms of the profit that would have
been made on the deal. Certainly no seller likes to cancel a contract
and return money, and most sellers probably would regard such an
occurrence as a loss. But the loss is only in terms of expectation, is
usually paid out of funds already received from the buyer and, most
importantly, is measurable by a ceiling of no more than the true value
of the goods sold.
Potential liability for consequential damages, on the other hand,
presents the horror of the unknown. Although such damages, by defi-
nition,120 must be reasonably calculable to be recoverable,121 their
amount is governed by what the law has long labeled foreseeable "spe-
cial circumstances" attributable to the unique operating structure of
the aggrieved party. Significantly, the amount of consequential dam-
ages for which the seller may be held responsible is not limited to, and
typically may far exceed, the value of the goods sold and the monies
previously paid by the buyer to the seller. This potential liability of
120. See U.C.C. § 2-715(2) (1978).
121. See id. § 1-106 comment 1.
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the seller is far in excess of the consideration received under the con-
tract and is an understandable cause for pause by both parties to the
contract. It is for this reason that sellers of goods almost always at-
tempt by negotiation or standardized contract forms to disclaim liabil-
ity for consequential damages in cases in which such damages can
foreseeably occur.
Even in negotiated contracts, it should not be difficult for most
sellers to convince their buyers of the reasonableness of their concern
about the potential for open-ended liability. This concern may be ex-
pressed in terms of an empathetic attempt to keep prices at a reason-
able level and of the inherent unfairness of requiring the seller to be
an insurer of the buyer's use of the goods. In turn, a buyer might un-
derstandably acquiesce in a seller's disclaimer of liability for conse-
quential damages at least so long as the seller can give adequate
assurance that the buyer's exposure to the risk of consequential loss
will be kept to a minimum. Such assurances might take the form of a
warranty on the part of the seller that the goods will be free from
defects for a certain period of time or amount of use or, in the alterna-
tive, that the seller will remedy the defect within a reasonable time.
In exchange for these or similar promises and for goods at a mutually
agreeable price, the buyer may agree to the allocation to him of the
risk of consequential loss.
Although the Official Comment to Section 2-719 labels this an allo-
cation of "unknown or undeterminable risks,"122 such risks are con-
versely quite reasonably known at the time of contracting and quite
reasonably calculable at the time of breach. Otherwise, the seller
would face little risk under the law for not disclaiming liability for
them. Breaching parties are not liable for unforeseeable damages or
for those that cannot be calculated with reasonable certainty. In fact,
it is just because such risks are known that the seller typically and
reasonably will seek to insulate himself from liability for consequen-
tial damages. Thus, in negotiated deals, the seller may make an un-
derstandable and reasonable request to disclaim liability for
consequential damages in return for firm assurances that the risk to
the buyer will be kept to a minimum by the expertise and good faith of
the seller in quickly correcting defects that might arise in the goods.
It would be reasonably accurate to characterize this allocation of
risk from the seller to the buyer as an implicit partnership or joint
venture based upon expressed assurances and the realistic proposi-
tions that even careful manufacturers or sellers may make or sell bad
goods, that even quality goods can go bad, and that it takes time to
correct defective goods during which significant special or consequen-
tial losses can be suffered. This scenario, of course, suggests a bargain-
122. See id. § 2-719 comment 3.
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ing context in which the parties are at roughly arms' length, in which
the risk allocation was a product of informed and specific negotiation,
and in which potential consequential loss suffered by the buyer is
agreed to be kept, by prompt and effective action of the seller, within
the parameters reasonably anticipated by the parties.
As a practical matter the scenario rarely will be articulated in just
this way. First, parties usually think or negotiate in terms of perform-
ance rather than breach. Second, even if the parties consider the mat-
ter of the goods not being as warranted, the assumption will be that
any defects in the goods will be of the usual sort and will be easily and
quickly correctable by the seller. Nevertheless, unless consequential
damage disclaimers are to be regarded as self-serving talismanic incan-
tations of divine rights and obligations, rather than the reasonable
product of informed albeit implicit negotiation, these basic assump-
tions must be regarded as part and parcel of every contract for the sale
of goods unless the contract itself, or the circumstances surrounding
its negotiation, clearly indicate otherwise.
There is nothing new or radical in this line of analysis, but there is
plenty that is difficult. Proper analysis of a given case under Section
2-719 requires the court to go beyond the bare and cold wording of the
contract and to engage in a process of lawfinding to determine what
Professor Llewellyn called the "essence" or "core" of the bargain
made.123 A buyer cannot be supposed to have bought goods merely to
lay them on the proverbial commercial dunghill. The essence of the
buyer's acceptance of the risk allocation of consequential damages is
the seller's promise to render the goods defect free within a reason-
able time. If the seller is unable as circumstances develop to honor
this promise, then the "essence" or "core" of the contract has been
frustrated, all bets should be off, and the buyer should be allowed re-
covery for consequential loss suffered after a reasonable period has
expired for the seller to repair or replace the goods. Only that conse-
quential loss which occurred during the reasonable time period for
correction of the defects was part of the risk assumed by the buyer
under the "core essence" of the damages limitation provision.
1. Unconsclonability
This perspective of the relationship between the seller's obligation
to honor the limited remedy and the allocation to the buyer of the risk
of interim consequential loss is akin to the basic contract law principle
that when one party fails to perform his obligations under the con-
123. See K. LLEwELYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADMON 362-71 (1960). See also El-
linghaus, In Defense of Unconscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757, 796-800 (1969)(Pro-
fessor Ellinghaus uses the labels "iron essence" and "transactional essence" to
describe the concept). See generally Eddy, supra note 3; Murray, The Realism of
Behaviorism Under the Uniform Commercial Code, 51 OR. L. REv. 269 (1972).
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tract, the other party is relieved as a matter of law from the obligation
of mutually dependent performance. As a general proposition, the
buyer's assumption of the risk of consequential loss under the terms of
the contract should be viewed as mutually dependent upon the seller's
warranty to provide defect-free goods within a reasonable time. What
could be more logical or fair than to treat warranty, disclaimer, and
remedy limitation as a mutually interdependent package? There is
plenty of support for this reasoning in the case law on both sides of the
Atlantic.124
Although the English appear to have backed away from their so-
called doctrine of "fundamental breach," perhaps the concept would
be more in favor if it was properly regarded as a guideline to assessing
the circumstances and bargaining context of a particular case rather
than as a fixed rule of law for general application. In any event, the
doctrine has a great deal of logical and conscionable merit: "Every
contract contains a 'core' or fundamental obligation which must be
performed. If one party fails to perform this fundamental obligation,
he will be guilty of a breach of contract whether or not any exempting
clause has been inserted which purports to protect him."125 Any other
result might be "unconscionable," to use the Article Two vernacular.
But whether the perspective is one of analyzing the "core essence" of
the remedy limitation package or of determining the mutual depen-
dency of its component parts, the Code requires more than the mere
failure of the seller to honor his obligations thereunder in order to
hold the seller liable for consequential damages suffered by the buyer.
In order to force liability on the seller, Section 2-719(3) requires that
the limitation or exclusion be found unconscionable. With respect to
the ongoing efficacy of consequential damage disclaimers, Section 2-
719(3) provides: "Consequential damages may be limited or excluded
unless the limitation or exclusion is unconscionable. Limitation of
consequential damages for injury to the person in the case of con-
sumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of damages
where the loss is commercial is not."'126
The most important thing about this provision is, of course, its use
of that word "unconscionable" as its base standard, a word having pa-
rameters which forever will escape precise definition. The provision
thus forces upon the court the process of carefully weighing the facts
and circumstances of each case before any determination can be made.
The next most important thing about the provision is that it, like sub-
section (2), is not primarily concerned with the initial validity of the
contract provision or with the procedural aspects of the bargaining
124. See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) OF CONTRACTS § 237 (1979).
125. Guest, Fundamental Breach of Contract, 77 LAW Q. REv. 98, 99 (1961)(footnote
omitted).
126. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1978).
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process. Matters such as trickery, oppression, unfair surprise, notice,
and conspicuousness are the province of Section 2-302 "unconsciona-
bility," matters which Professor Leff labeled "procedural unconscio-
nability."M Although a great measure of superfluity exists in Article
Two provisions dealing with the seamless web of warranty, disclaimer,
remedy limitations, liquidated damage provisions, and the like, Sec-
tion 2-719(3) is much more than a redundancy to Section 2-302. Sec-
tion 2-302 is concerned by its very terms with unconscionability in
contract "at the time it was made."128 Section 2-719(3), on the other
hand is concerned with how a consequential damage disclaimer oper-
ates in light of circumstances as they occur after the contract is made.
In the words of the Official Comment to the provision: "[S]ubsection
(3) recognizes the validity of clauses limiting or excluding consequen-
tial damages but makes it clear that they may not operate in an uncon-
scionable manner."1 2 9
This type of unconscionability can be labeled "intervening uncon-
scionability." To illustrate its application, assume a contract for the
sale of consumer goods containing the following clause: "In no event
shall seller be responsible for consequential damages suffered by
buyer." Assume further no frailties in the bargaining process, that the
clause was carefully pointed out to the buyer, and that the parties
were of fairly equal bargaining strength. At this point, is the clause
valid or invalid? The clause is specifically authorized by Sections 2-
316(4), 2-719(1), and 2-719(3), and it in no way violates Section 2-302,
Section 2-719(3), or of any other provision of Article Two. The clause
is valid. Now assume that the goods go bad and the buyer suffers con-
sequential loss. Whether the clause remains valid under Section 2-
719(3) depends on how the clause operates in terms of the occurrence
of circumstances subsequent to contracting, not only the failure of the
goods to perform as warranted but also the type of loss suffered by the
buyer. If the buyer's consequential loss is solely economic, Section 2-
719(3) strongly suggests that the clause remains valid; it is not opera-
ting in an unconscionable manner. Conversely, if the defect in the
goods caused the consumer buyer personal injuries, the clause almost
certainly will be stricken; it operates in an unconscionable manner.
Similarly, even if the buyer's loss was merely economic, the clause
might nevertheless be invalidated under Section 2-719(3) if the seller
willfully caused that loss by a callous refusal to honor the agreed rem-
edy of repairing the goods. Otherwise, the provision excluding liabil-
ity for consequential damages, although perfectly valid at the time of
contracting, would be operating in an unconscionable manner.
127. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Cause, 115 U. PA. L.
REv. 485, 486-87 (1967).
128. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978).
129. Id. § 2-719 comment 3.
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Section 2-719(3), of course, does not focus entirely, merely primar-
ily, on circumstances subsequent to contracting. A provision under
Section 2-719(3) can be invalid from the inception of the contract. An
obvious example of this is a clause excluding by its express terms lia-
bility for personal injuries in the sale of consumer goods. But this
would be a case of what Professor Leff calls "substantive unconsciona-
bility."130 "Procedural unconscionability," a gross inequity in the bar-
gaining process, remains the province of Section 2-302. The important
point, however, is that even if a provision disclaiming liability for con-
sequential damages can escape the snare of Section 2-302, it may still
fall prey to Section 2-719(3) if it operates in an unconscionable
manner.
To make an accurate determination of intervening unconscionabil-
ity, Section 2-719(3) requires that the court go through the difficult
process of examining not only the language of the contract, but that
language in context with the circumstances surrounding the bargain-
ing process and those as they develop subsequent to contracting. The
difficulty is not insurmountable. The courts long have engaged suc-
cessfully in the quite similar process of determining whether a partic-
ular breach was of a material (and thus dependent) obligation so as to
relieve the aggrieved party of his return performance or was merely a
partial breach (of an independent obligation) which would not relieve
the aggrieved party. Many of the factors usually considered by the
courts in making such determinations would be equally applicable to a
determination of whether the seller's failure to honor the agreed rem-
edy would cause the consequential damage disclaimer to operate in an
unconscionable manner.1 31
Much of the focus should be on whether the seller used best efforts
to honor the agreed remedy and thus minimize the buyer's loss or, in
cases of good faith efforts, on the magnitude of the consequential loss
the buyer suffered. However, Section 2-719(3) requires that leaving
the loss on the buyer be much more than unfair; it must be uncon-
130. Leff, supra note 127, at 486-87.
131. See generally RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 275 (1932). Section 275 provides:
In determining the materiality of a failure fully to perform a promise,
the following circumstances are influencial [sic]:
(a) The extent to which the injured party will obtain the substantial
benefit which he could have reasonably anticipated;
(b) The extent to which the injured party may be adequately com-
pensated in damages for lack of complete performance;
(c) The extent to which the party failing to perform has already
partly performed or made preparations for performance;
(d) The greater or less hardship on the party failing to perform in
terminating the contract;
(e) The willfl1, negligent or innocent behavior of the party failing
to perform;
(f) The greater or less uncertainty that the party failing to perform
will perform the remainder of the contract.
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scionable. It must be kept in mind that, except in cases of goods to be
manufactured to the buyer's specifications or perhaps in cases of pro-
totype or experimental goods, the buyer generally relies on the seller's
expertise and knowledge with respect to the goods and upon the
seller's promise that the goods will be free from defects or quickly will
be rendered so. In return, the buyer agrees to accept allocation of the
risk of consequential loss. If the seller intends other than this, if he
means that his disclaimer is independent of his promises regarding the
limited remedy, if he means to assault common sense with the asser-
tion that his language "in no event shall I be liable" really means
"even if all my promises to alleviate your injury fail I am not liable,"
then at a minimum the seller should be required to articulate the her-
esy with a great deal more specificity and precision than the cursory
language usually used in contracts of this sort.
Again, there is nothing new here. In fact, there is a long line of
pre-Code cases and a burgeoning line of post-Code cases which invali-
date warranty disclaimers and remedy limitations in cases in which
the goods varied significantly from the contract description. Certainly
unrepairable, substantially defective goods are significantly different
from goods promised either to be free from defects or capable of being
so rendered within a reasonable time. Several of the pre-Code cases
can be found enshrined in the Official Comment to Section 2-302 as
examples of unconscionability.132 In perhaps the best known of the
group, the buyer was allowed to recover consequential damages in the
form of lost profits notwithstanding a limited remedy provision that
ostensibly barred their recovery. The seller delivered to the buyer a
used and defective machine instead of the new machine called for by
the contract. The court said:
Plaintiff was under obligation to deliver to Defendant a machine that com-
plied with the description in the contract; performance of that obligation was a
condition precedent, having the force of a warranty after acceptance, with
which plaintiff was bound to comply before it was entitled to urge that defend-
ant was precluded from asserting the ordinary remedies available to it for
breach of such contract.133
Similar reasoning has been used in Code cases to invalidate provi-
sions limiting or excluding consequential damages. For example, in
Wilson Trading the fundamental basis of the court's decision was that
132. See Meyer v. Packard Cleveland Motor Co., 106 Ohio St. 328, 140 N.E. 118
(1922)(vehicle delivered was totally unfit for use as dump truck contracted for);
F.C. Austin Co. v. J.H. Tillman C., 104 Ore. 541, 209 P. 131 (1922)(delivery of
asphalt mixing machine that wholly failed to correspond with the description in
the contract); Andrews Bros. v. Singer & Co., 1 K.B. 17 (1934)(C.A.)(used car
delivered in place of new car contracted for); Robert A. Munro & Co. v. Meyer, 2
K.B. 312 (1930)(delivery of adulterated meat substantially different from that re-
quired by the contract); Green v. Arcos, Ltd., 47 T.L.R. 336 (C.A. 1931)(delivery of
timber substantially different than that contracted for).
133. F.C. Austin Co. v. J.H. Tiliman Co., 104 Or. 541, 552, 209 P. 131, 134 (1922).
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it would be unseemly, unwise, or unconscionable to allow the seller to
shelter behind the remedy limitation provision until it had effectively
honored its obligations under other parts of the warranty package by
providing the buyer with goods substantially free from latent de-
fects.134 The same result should follow whether the seller warrants
the goods to be free from latent defects as in Wilson Trading, or free
from unrepairable defects, as in cases involving an agreed repair rem-
edy. For example, in a well-known case the court held the buyer was
entitled to a recovery of consequential damages notwithstanding the
existence of a separate clause excluding such damages. The court had
found that the limited repair or replacement remedy failed of its es-
sential purpose under Section 2-719(2). The court said:
'The limitations of remedy and of liability are not separable from the obliga-
tions of the warranty. Repudiation of the obligations of the warranty destroys
its benefits. The complaint alleges facts that would constitute a repudiation
by the defendants of their obligations under the warranty, that repudiation
consisting of their willful failure or their careless and negligent compliance.
It should be obvious that they cannot at once repudiate their obligations under
the warranty and assert its provisions beneficial to them.'
1 3 5
Of course, any good theory can be applied incorrectly. In one case
involving a contract for the sale and installation of rain gutters on the
buyer's home, the contract specifically limited the seller's responsibil-
ity in the event of defects to the cost of labor and materials for repair.
When defects became apparent, the seller repaired them in a reason-
able manner. In the interim, however, the buyer suffered consequen-
tial damages in the amount of $1,759 for water damage to her house.
In upholding a recovery in this amount, the court said: "The correc-
tion of the defect without compensating the plaintiff for her loss, de-
prived her of the 'substantial value of the bargain'; thus, the remedy
failed of its essential purpose. ' 13 6 The case was incorrectly decided
and is probably understandable only on the basis of an implicit con-
sumer protection policy. The buyer's bargain promised her defect-free
goods and services or those that could be rendered so within a reason-
able time and imposed upon her liability for consequential damages
occurring within a reasonable time period necessary for the seller to
repair any defects. On the facts given, to allow the buyer's recovery
for consequential damages was to ignore the bargain made and to
restructure the risks fairly allocated between the parties. Only if the
seller was unable to repair within a reasonable time should recovery
for damage to the house have been allowed, and that recovery prop-
134. See Wilson Trading Corp. v. David Ferguson, Ltd., 23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685,
297 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1968); see also supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
135. KKO, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 892, 897 (N.D. Il. 1981)(quoting Adams
v. J.I. Case Co., 125 I11. App. 2d. 388, 402-03, 261 N.E.2d 1, 7-8 (1970)).
136. Reynolds v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 701, 708
(Mass. Dis. Ct. 1972).
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erly should have been limited to the damage occurring after the expi-
ration of a reasonable period of time to allow the seller to conduct
repairs. The seller in the case had honored the remedy as agreed.
Conversely, in situations in which the seller is unable to honor the
agreed remedy limitation, a court is in error if it insists on giving a
provision excluding consequential damages a wholly independent ef-
fect by ignoring the question of whether the failure of the agreed rem-
edy would cause the consequential damage exclusion remedy to act in
an unconscionable manner. To proceed in this fashion is to ignore the
bargain that was in all probability at least implicitly made, and thus to
reallocate the risks assumed by the parties by giving the consequential
damage disclaimer an effect at variance with the intent of the parties.
The interdependency of the warranty disclaimer, remedy limitation
package should hold all the more true with respect to standardized
contracts or other contracts consummated without detailed negotia-
tion. With respect to such contracts, common sense and common un-
derstanding must take precedence over individualized intent outside
the course of normal behavior. This often can be accomplished by sim-
ply following the basic maxims of contract law of construing the stan-
dardized contract most strictly against the party responsible for its
drafting.
2. CAVEAT: Complex, Experimental, or Prototype Goods
In sales of standardized goods, a seller's failure to honor an agreed
limited remedy of repair or replacement usually should be found to
have upset a basic assumption underlying the warranty, remedy limi-
tation, consequential damage disclaimer package. The question under
Section 2-719 then becomes whether enforcement of the disclaimer of
liability for consequential damages would be unconscionable. How-
ever, in the sale of unique, prototype, or experimental goods, or goods
manufactured to the buyer's own specifications, the reasonable expec-
tation of the parties regarding the warranty package may be quite dif-
ferent. In such contracts a provision that "in no event shall seller be
liable for consequential damages" may mean just that, both in the ab-
stract and in the context of the bargain made.
Often, particularly with respect to goods manufactured to the
buyer's specifications, the seller may be unwilling to make any war-
ranty at all other than to provide goods of the contract description. In
other cases the seller may be willing to go a bit further and promise to
use good faith and diligent efforts to correct defects as they arise, but
not that the repair attempts will be successful. In such cases, of
course, this very limited remedy should not be found to fail under sub-
section (2) if the seller has acted with good faith and diligence. In still
other unique goods cases, the seller might go even further and war-
rant repair or replacement of defects as is common with standardized
19881
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goods. In all three classes of cases, a clause excluding liability for con-
sequential damages takes on a different meaning than in the sale of
standardized goods. In the first two, the provision should be given ef-
fect because no agreed remedy has failed. In the first situation, no
warranty was made; in the second, the agreed remedy was honored by
good faith and diligence.
In the third class of cases, even though the seller warranted repair
or replacement, the consequential damages excluder probably should
be read quite literally and strictly. Even if the agreed remedy fails,
the excluder most often should be regarded as having an independent
validity. An excellent case in point is American Electric Power Co. v.
Westinghouse Electric Corp.,137 which involved the sale of a complex
and somewhat experimental turbine generator. The seller warranted
the generator to be "free of defects in workmanship and material" and
promised, as the buyer's exclusive remedy, to correct any defects by
suitable repair or replacement. The contract also contained a provi-
sion limiting the seller's liability for consequential damages to the con-
tract price of the equipment sold. In granting the seller's motion for
summary judgment with respect to the buyer's claim for consequential
damages, the court strongly emphasized the complex and experimen-
tal nature of the goods.
Further, the rule that the agreed-upon allocation of commercial risk should
not be disturbed is particularly appropriate where, as here, the warranty item
is a highly complex, sophisticated, and in some ways experimental piece of
equipment. Moreover, compliance with a warranty to repair or replace must
depend on the type of machinery in issue. In the case of a multi-million dollar
turbine generator, we are not dealing with a piece of equipment that either
works or does not, or is fully repaired or not at all. On the contrary, the nor-
mal operation of a turbine-generator spans too large a spectrum for such sim-
ple characterizations.
1 3 8
The court, however, refused to grant seller's motion for summary
judgment with respect to the buyer's claim for general damages. The
buyer alleged that Westinghouse had acted "in bad faith" in con-
ducting repairs and had been "willfully dilatory in rendering repairs,
and ha[d] not merely failed to repair or replace, but ha[d] repudiated
its obligation to repair and replace."139 The court reasoned that fact
issues had been raised regarding Westinghouse's alleged intentional
misconduct. The court held that if these fact issues could be resolved
in favor of the buyer, the remedy limitation would have failed of its
essential purpose.
It is not clear from the opinion why the court thought that proof of
the alleged willful misconduct by the seller would not also cause the
consequential damage limitation provision to operate in an uncon-
137. 418 F. Supp. 435 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
138. Id at 458 (footnote omitted).
139. Id at 453.
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scionable manner. The generator had been completely shut down for
two separate five-month periods for repairs, and the buyer alleged
that the machine never functioned according to rated specifications.
Perhaps the court was of the opinion that the consequential loss was
attributable solely to the complexity of the goods rather than to any
intentional misconduct by the seller. If the buyer had been able to
prove a nexus between such misconduct and the consequential loss,
surely the court could have found that the clause excluding the loss
was unconscionable under the facts as they occurred.
The complex goods factor, as articulated in American Eectric
Power, was a primary basis for a recent decision of the New Jersey.
Supreme Court upholding a contractual provision excluding liability
for consequential damages even though the limited repair or replace-
ment remedy had been found to have failed of its essential purpose.140
The case involved the sale for $167,000 of a complex, computer-con-
trolled machine tool to a "sophisticated buyer." In a thoughtful opin-
ion, the court focused on the competing policies of freedom of contract
and that of providing the buyer with a fair measure of remedy. The
court said:
These competing policies-freedom of contract, including the right to exclude
liability for consequential damages, and the insistence upon minimum ade-
quate remedies to redress a breach of contract-frame the issue before us. If a
limitation or exclusion of consequential damages is not unconscionable when
the contract is made, must it be held unenforceable if the limited remedies
provided in the contract do not achieve their intended purpose?141
The trial court instructed the jury that it could award consequential
damages to the buyer regardless of the excluder provision in the con-
tract if it found that the seller failed to repair the machine to its war-
ranted condition. The court found this instruction inappropriate and
held that the contract fairly allocated the risk of consequential loss to
the buyer. The court said that, on the facts of the case-in particular,
those of a sophisticated buyer purchasing complex equipment-it
could not be said that "the allocation of risk through exclusion of con-
sequential damages was inextricably tied to the limitation of
remedies." 42
In another case involving the sale of a complex turbine generator,
the court took a different tack. The court concluded that the seller's
repair warranty was limited to good faith efforts to make repairs. The
court said:
But even if the Court accepts PEPCO's contention that the turbine-generator
failed to meet the guaranteed heat rate and that as a result they are faced with
increased fuel costs, the defendant has conscientiously and continually ex-
140. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Master Engraving Co., 107 N.J. 584, 527 A.2d 429
(1987).
141. Id- at 593, 527 A.2d at 434 (footnote omitted).
142. Id. at 602, 527 A.2d at 439.
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erted its best efforts to correct the problem. At no time has Westinghouse
repudiated or attempted to escape from the obligations of the warranty. To
the contrary, it has continued to promptly employ every means to correct the
heat rate problem under the repair and replacement provisions as well as by
continuing research, the benefits of which PEPCO also receives.
1 43
The court concluded that the buyer had not suffered consequential
damages beyond those reasonably contemplated by the parties. The
court said: "Nor has the plaintiff lost the substantial part of its bar-
gain by virtue of the warranty. The unit is still operative and the in-
creased fuel costs as stated by the plaintiff have not been excessive by
any standard."'" Unique goods cases, then, represent the kind of situ-
ation in which the courts quite properly can find that the parties in-
tended the consequential damages clause to be given effect wholly
independent of the limited remedy provision.
B. The Case Law
Section 2-719 has generated a prodigious amount of litigation. To
date, courts have taken varying approaches to resolving the question
of the continued efficacy of a provision excluding consequential dam-
ages once an agreed remedy has been found to fail of its essential pur-
pose. Recent cases have demonstrated a concern consistent with the
perspective discussed above,145 on whether the failure of the agreed
remedy presents a case of "intervening" unconscionability thereby in-
validating the provision allocating to the buyer liability for conse-
quential damages. The results in most cases are quite understandable.
Unfortunately, however, many courts continue to analyze unconscion-
ability of clauses excluding or limiting consequential damages in terms
of the circumstances as they existed at the time of contracting under
Section 2-302 rather than in terms of whether intervening circum-
stances have caused the clause to operate in an unconscionable man-
ner.146 The various approaches taken by the courts will be discussed
in turn.
1. Failure of Essential Purpose of Agreed Remedy
Under one line of decision a buyer is automatically entitled to re-
cover consequential damages if the remedy limitation is found to have
failed under Section 2-719(2). This approach is based on a literal read-
ing of Section 2-719(2) which states that upon failure of an exclusive
143. Potomac Elec. Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 572,578-79 (D.
D.C. 1974)(citation omitted).
144. I& at 579. See also U.S. Fibers, Inc. v. Proctor & Schwartz, Inc., 358 F. Supp. 449
(E.D. Mich. 1972)(sale of experimental conveyor-oven).
145. See supra text accompanying notes 115-44.
146. See generally U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 3 (1978). "Subsection (3) recognizes the
validity of clauses limiting or excluding consequential damages but makes it clear
that they may not operate in an unconscionable manner." Id.
[Vol. 67:548
LIMITATIONS ON REMEDIES
remedy, "remedy may be had as provided in this Act."147 Once these
decisions determine that the remedy limitation has failed, they then
often simply state conclusively, without analysis, that consequential
damages are, therefore, recoverable despite the separate exclusion
language in the agreement. 148
Two early cases usually are cited as root precedent for the proposi-
tion that failure of the essential purpose of an exclusive remedy under
Section 2-719(2) automatically allows a buyer recourse to all Article
Two remedies, including consequential damages.149 In Adams v. J.I
Case Co.,150 the buyer purchased a tractor for use in his business. The
contract contained a standard repair or replacement warranty and ex-
plicitly excluded any liability for consequential damages. The tractor
developed serious defects, and the buyer returned it to the dealer for
repairs. Although the defects could have been corrected in about a
week, the dealer kept the tractor for several months before repairing
it. The court held that the dealer's dilatory conduct breached an im-
plied warranty to correct defects within a reasonable time, thus caus-
ing the limited repair or replacement remedy to fail of its essential
purpose. As a result, the court concluded that the buyer was entitled
to all remedies under the Code, including consequential damages.151
In Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro,152 the federal district
court faced an issue of first impression under illinois law of whether
the failure of a limited repair or replacement warranty automatically
invalidated a contract provision excluding liability for consequential
damages. The court noted that Adams was the only reported decision
to date to have faced the issue, and the court opted to follow Adams.
As an additional basis for its decision, the court relied upon the Offi-
cial Comment to Section 2-719 which provides that when a remedy
limitation clause fails, "it must give way to the general remedy provi-
147. Id. § 2-719(2). See also id. § 2-719 comment 1 (if an exclusive remedy is found to
have failed, "it must give way to the general remedy provisions of this Article").
148. R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1985); Soo
Line R. v. Fruehauf Corp., 547 F.2d 1365 (8th Cir. 1977); Koehring Co. v. A.P.I.,
Inc., 369 F. Supp. 882 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro
Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Waterson, 13
Ark. App. 77, 679 S.W.2d 814 (1984); Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388,
261 N.E.2d 1 (1970). All of these cases found that the limited repair or replace-
ment remedy failed because of the seller's willful misconduct. Although none of
the decisions purport to analyze the validity of the consequential disclaimer
under a separate unconscionability standard, the decisions perhaps would have
been better based on such an analysis. See infra text accompanying notes 173-
210.
149. Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Ill. 1970); Ad-
ams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970).
150. 125 Ill. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970).
151. A better ground for the decision would have been that the seller's willfully dila-
tory conduct constituted intervening unconscionability under Section 2-719(3).
152. 320 F. Supp. 39 (N.D. Ill. 1970).
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sions of this Article."153
Until the late 1970s, the approach of the Adams and Birdsboro
courts dominated the decisions across the country on the question of
the continued efficacy of contractual provisions excluding or limiting
liability for consequential damages. Although subsequently most
courts have adopted alternative approaches to analyzing the issue,1 5 4
an occasional decision, usually a consumer case, continues to follow
the Adams and Birdsboro line of analysis.55 For example, the Eighth
Circuit in 1985 allowed the buyer to recover consequential damages
despite an exclusion of them in the sales contract. 5 6 The contract
limited the seller's liability to replacement of the glass panels which
were the subject of the sale. Upon a finding that the seller was unable
and unwilling to supply adequate replacements for the defective
panels, the court found the limited remedy to have failed of its essen-
tial purpose under Section 2-719(2). Although the court acknowledged
that many jurisdictions allow an independent consequential damage
exclusion to survive failure of a limited remedy, the court stated that
Missouri authority permits a recovery of consequential damages in
any case in which the exclusive remedy is found to have failed. As
authority for its conclusion, the court relied upon the language of Sec-
tion 2-719(2) and that of Official Comment 1, as well as upon Missouri
decisions.15 7
The rule set out in these cases is most often applied by courts to
consumer transactions.158 Although the occasional commercial case
following this line of analysis usually involves willful or dilatory con-
duct on the part of the seller, -59 the consumer cases often involve a
seller who makes good faith attempts but is unable to repair.1 60 Re-
153. U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 1 (1978).
154. See supra text accompanying notes 145-53 and infra text accompanying notes 155-
72.
155. Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago, 310 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1981); John Deere
Co. v. Hand, 211 Neb. 549, 319 N.W.2d 434 (1982).
156. R.W. Murray Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1985).
157. Id. at 271-73. Again, a better ground for decision would have been the intervening
unconscionability under Section 2-719(3) caused by the seller's willful refusal to
honor the limited remedy.
158. See Hartzell v. Justus Co., 693 F.2d 770 (8th Cir. 1982); Riley v. Ford Motor Co.,
442 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1971); Hibbs v. Jeep Corp., 666 S.W.2d 792 (Mo. Ct. Ap.
1984); Goddard v. General Motors Corp., 60 Ohio St. 2d 41, 396 N.E.2d 761 (1979);
Orr Chevrolet, Inc. v. Courtney, 488 S.W.2d 883 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972); Murray v.
Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 265 N.W.2d 513 (1978).
159. See Custom Automated Mach. v. Penda Corp., 537 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Ill. 1982);
Fargo Mach. & Tool Co. v. Kearney & Trecker Corp., 428 F. Supp. 364 (E.D. Mich.
1977).
160. See Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago, 310 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1981); Durfee
v. Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977); John Deere Co. v.
Hand, 211 Neb. 549, 319 N.W.2d 434 (1982); Goddard v. General Motors Corp., 60
Ohio St. 2d 41, 396 N.E.2d 761 (1979); Osburn v. Bendix Home Sys., Inc., 613 P.2d
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gardless of the context of the contract, consumer or commercial, and
even though the cases purport to be relying on the express language of
Section 2-719(2), all of these cases overlook the fact that Section 2-
719(3) establishes a separate standard for judging the validity of a con-
tract clause limiting or excluding consequential damages.
2. Unconscionability Under Section 2-719(3)
a. In General
Section 2-719(3) provides that the standard for judging the efficacy
of a consequential damage disclaimer is unconscionability, a standard
independent of the failure of essential purpose standard in Section 2-
719(2). This rather obvious point was first made by a court in 1970 in
County Asphalt Inc. v. Lewis W. Welding & Engineering Corp.16 1:
Plaintiff would have U.C.C. § 2-719 read in such a fashion as to result in all
limitations whatsoever being stricken in any event in which an exclusive rem-
edy should fail of its essential purpose. A better reading is that the exclusive
remedy clause should be ignored; other clauses limiting remedies in less dras-
tic manners and on different theories stand or fall independently of the
stricken clause. Since the clause excluding consequential damages has been
held not unconscionable, and is not otherwise offensive, it will be applied. 162
Nevertheless, virtually all of the early cases held that failure of an
agreed remedy under Section 2-719(2) automatically resulted in the
failure of a separate provision excluding or limiting liability for conse-
quential damages.163 Of late, however, the situation has changed dra-
matically. Beginning in the late 1970s and presumably encouraged by
the views of commentators on the point, courts began to hold that con-
tractual provisions limiting or excluding consequential damages must
be judged independently of the agreed remedy..6 4 Today, the majority
of courts hold that consequential damage disclaimers are to be judged
separately under the unconscionability standard of Section 2-719(3).165
445 (Okla. 1980); Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d 406, 265 N.W.2d 513
(1978).
161. 323 F. Supp. 1300 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), qff'd, 444 F.2d 372 (2d Cir. 1970), cert denied,
404 U.S. 939 (1971).
162. Id at 1309.
163. See supma text accompanying notes 147-60.
164. Two oft-cited law review articles supporting this proposition are: Anderson,
supra note 12; and Eddy, supra note 3.
165. See Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir.
1980)(unconscionability of consequential damage disclaimer under Section 2-
719(3) is a discreet question from failure of essential purpose of limited remedy);
Carboline Co. v. Oxmoor Center, 40 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1728 (Ky. App.
1985)(Section 2-719(3) on the exclusion of consequential damages is mutually ex-
clusive from Section 2-719(2)); Belfont Sales Corp. v. Gruen Indus., 112 A.D.2d 96,
491 N.Y.S.2d 652 (1985)(remedy limitation and consequential damage disclaimer
appear in separate clauses, are dealt with by separate provisions in Section 2-719
and, therefore, a separate analysis is required). An occasional court specifically
disavows this position. See Jones & McKnight Corp. v. Birdsboro Corp., 320 F.
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Despite this general agreement among courts today that the uncon-
scionability standard is the touchstone for analyzing the efficacy of
consequential damage disclaimers, the situation remains a bit chaotic.
Courts are divided on the question of the point in time at which un-
conscionability is to be tested. 6 6 A majority of the decisions to date
address unconscionability in terms of the circumstances as they ex-
isted at the inception of the contract.1 67 These decisions rely on the
Code's general unconscionability provision, Section 2-302, which spe-
cifically mandates that unconscionability be judged at the time of the
making of the contract. 6 8
As suggested above, 69 however, a persuasive argument can be
made that Section 2-719(3)'s requirement that the exclusion of conse-
quential damages not be unconscionable is a separate consideration,
apart from Section 2-302, that requires the clause excluding liability
for consequential damages to be evaluated in terms of whether cir-
cumstances since the time of contracting have operated to make the
exclusion unconscionable. Of course, if the clause is found to be un-
conscionable at the inception of the contract under Section 2-302, one
need never reach the question of unconscionability under Section 2-
719(3). This "intervening unconscionability" approach to analyzing
the standard in Section 2-719(3) finds support from several proposi-
tions. First, the language in Official Comment 3 to Section 2-719 spe-
Supp. 39 (N.D. Ill. 1970)(holding that merely because the exclusion of conse-
quential damages is authorized under subsection (3) of Section 2-719 does not
mean that it is not covered by subsection (2) of Section 2-719).
166. This is a moot issue in the state of Washington which has added local law com-
mentary to its version of Section 2-719. This commentary states that Section 2-
719(2) "relates to contractual arrangements which become oppressive by a change
of circumstances; [Section 2-719(3)], to contracts oppressive at their inception."
Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309, 1315 (9th Cir. 1984).
167. See Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Silas Corp. of America, 761 F.2d 553 (9th Cir.
1985); Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984); Lewis Refrig-
eration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d 427 (6th Cir.
1984); Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1983); Select
Pork, Inc. v. Babcock Serv., Inc., 640 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1981); Computerized Ra-
diological Serv. v. Cyntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); KKO, Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Willie v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
C., 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976); Carboline Co. v. Oxmoor Center, 40 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 728 (Ky. Ct. App. 1985); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bucy-
rus-Erie Co., 131 Wis. 2d 21, 388 N.W.2d 584 (1986). Compare Chatlos Sys., Inc. v.
National Cash Register Corp., 6 3 5 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980) and S.M. Wilson & Co.
v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978)(evaluating unconscionability
under Section 2-719(3) by examining circumstances both at the inception of the
contract and subsequently).
168. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978). See also Fischer v. General Elec. Hotpoint, 108 Misc. 2d 683,
438 N.Y.S.2d 690, 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 849 (1981)(invalidating clause
excluding liability for consequential damages in a consumer case under Section 2-
719(3) and Section 2-302 because of disparity in bargaining power).
169. See supra text accompanying notes 115-44.
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cifically states that the concern is that the disclaimer "not operate in
an unconscionable manner."170 This language indicates an intent on
the part of the drafters to evaluate the unconscionability of a clause
limiting or excluding liability for consequential damages in light of cir-
cumstances and facts beyond those existing at the inception of the con-
tract. Further, if unconscionability under Section 2-719(3) is the same
as under Section 2-302, then Section 2-719(3) is completely superflu-
ous. Finally, to ignore factors subsequent to contracting in assessing
unconscionability is to risk allowing the contract provision to operate
contrary to the intent and agreement of the parties. Although, to date,
but a few decisions have articulated support for the "intervening un-
conscionability" approach,171 it is common for the courts to consider
circumstances subsequent to contracting in determining the uncon-
scionability of consequential damage disclaimers.172
b. Wilfful Failure to Honor the Agreed Limited Remedy
Willful or dilatory conduct of the seller subsequent to contracting,
for example by unreasonably refusing to honor the agreed limited
remedy, is a major factor bearing on the issue of unconscionability
under Section 2-719(3). These seller's fault cases represent excellent
examples of intervening unconscionability. However, it is often easier
to predict the result in such cases-recovery of consequential damages
for the buyer- than it is to follow the reasoning of the courts. This is
because the courts continue to focus myopically on the language in
Section 2-302 which refers to an agreement "unconscionable at the
time it was made."173 Regardless, the cases consistently hold that the
intervening act of a seller's willful refusal to honor an agreed remedy
limitation will result in the court's striking as unconscionable a sepa-
rate provision excluding or limiting consequential damages.174
Many of these cases, particularly the ones involving consumers,
contain little, if any discussion of Section 2-719(3) and apparently rest
on the proposition that the failure of an agreed remedy under Section
2-719(2) automatically invalidates a provision excluding or limiting
170. U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 3 (1978).
171. See Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984); Chatlos Sys.,
Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); S.M. Wilson &
Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978).
172. See supra notes 173-87.
173. U.C.C. § 2-302 (1978).
174. See R.W. Murray, Co. v. Shatterproof Glass Corp., 758 F.2d 266 (8th Cir. 1985);
Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984); Select Pork, Inc. v.
Babcock Swine, Inc., 640 F.2d 147 (8th Cr. 1981); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National
Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980); KKO, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,
517 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Ill. 1981); Hibbs v. Jeep Corp., 666 S.W.2d 792 (Mo. App.
1984).
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consequential damages. 175 Unfortunately, this line of reasoning often
leads courts to invalidate separate consequential damage disclaimers
even though the seller attempted in good faith, albeit unsuccessfully,
to honor the agreed limited remedy.176 Better reasoned decisions,
even in consumer cases, hold that if the seller is in good faith in at-
tempting to honor the failed remedy, the separate consequential dam-
age disclaimer remains valid.177
The majority of recent decisions consider the issue of unconsciona-
bility under Section 2-719(3) independently of the failure of an agreed
remedy under Section 2-719(2).178 Nevertheless, the majority of these
cases state that unconscionability is to be assessed in terms of the facts
and circumstances at the time of contracting, per Section 2-302.179
Ironically, the key factor in a finding of unconscionability in many of
these cases is the willful or dilatory actions of the seller subsequent to
contracting.180 It is indeed surprising that so many courts remain
wedded to the erroneous proposition that unconscionability under the
Code must be tied exclusively to pre-contract facts or events.
The conceptual difficulties encountered by failing to distinguish in-
tervening unconscionability under Section 2-719(3) from pre-contract
unconscionability under Section 2-302 is well demonstrated in KKO,
175. See Waters v. Massey-Ferguson, 41 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1553 (4th Cir.
1985); Riley v. Ford Motor Co., 442 F.2d 670 (5th Cir. 1971); Winchester v. McCul-
louch Bros. Garage, 388 So. 2d 927 (Ala. 1980); Ford Motor Co. v. Mayes, 575
S.W.2d 480 (Ky. Ct. App. 1978); Hibbs v. Jeep Corp., 666 S.W.2d 792 (Mo. App.
1984); Goddard v. General Motors Corp., 60 Ohio St. 2d 41, 396 N.E.2d 761 (1979);
Devore v. Bostrom, 632 P.2d 832 (Utah 1981).
176. Jacobs v. Rosemount Dodge-Winnebago, 310 N.W.2d 71 (Minn. 1981); Durfee v.
Rod Baxter Imports, Inc., 262 N.W.2d 349 (Minn. 1977); John Deere Co. v. Hand,
211 Neb. 549,319 N.W.2d 434 (1982); Goddard v. General Motors Corp., 60 Ohio St.
2d 41, 396 N.E.2d 761 (1979); Osburn v. Bendix Home Sys., Inc., 29 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 119 (Okla. 1980); Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 83 Wis. 2d
406, 265 N.W.2d 513 (1978).
177. See Stutts v. Green Ford, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 503, 267 S.E. 2d 919 (1980).
178. See supra notes 161-72.
179. See Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Silas Corp. of America, 761 F.2d 553 (9th Cir.
1985); Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984); Lewis Refrig-
eration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vegetable & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d 427 (6th Cir.
1983); Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes, Inc., 723 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1983); Select
Pork, Inc. v. Babcock Swine, Inc., 640 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1981); Computerized Ra-
diological Servs. v. Syntex Corp., 595 F. Supp. 1495 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); KKO, Inc. v.
Honeywell, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. M. 1981); Willie v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 219 Kan. 755, 549 P.2d 903 (1976); Carboline Co. v. Oxmoor Center, 40 U.C.C.
Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1728 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Bucy-
rus-Erie Co., 131 Wis. 2d 21, 388 N.W.2d 584 (1986). Compare Chatlos Sys., Inc. v.
National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980) and S.M. Wilson & Co.
v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978).
180. See Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984); Select Pork, Inc.
v. Babcock Swine, Inc., 640 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1981); KKO, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.,
517 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc.'81 The case involved two "giant" corporations
that had dealt with each other for many years. The dispute arose after
the seller made a change in the manufacturing process of electrical
contactors it had been selling to the buyer and to its other customers.
This change in the manufacturing process was instituted without ad-
vising the seller's customers, and it resulted in the new contactors be-
ing defective. The seller then recalled all of the defective contactors,
including those sold to customers of the buyer. These latter con-
tactors were replaced with new models, but the contactors remaining
in the buyer's inventory were merely "repaired." The buyer exper-
ienced further difficulty with the repaired contactors and insisted that
the seller replace them as well. The seller refused this request and
the buyer initiated its own recall of items sold to its customers which
contained the defective repaired contactors. The buyer then brought
suit against the seller to recover losses incurred as a result of the mal-
functioning contactors, most of which losses took the form of conse-
quential damages. The contract of sale at issue contained a standard
repair or replacement warranty and a separate consequential damage
exclusion. The seller moved for summary judgment based on the con-
sequential damage excluder. For purposes of the motion, the court
assumed that the limited repair or replacement remedy had failed of
its essential purpose. If this was true, said the court, then the buyer
was entitled to a recovery of consequential damages notwithstanding
the existence of the separate clause excluding such damages:
The limitations of remedy and of liability are not separable from the obliga-
tions of the warranty. Repudiation of the obligations of the warranty destroys
its benefits. The complaint alleges facts that would constitute a repudiation
by the defendants of their obligations under the warranty, that repudiation
consisting of their wilful failure or their careless and negligent compliance. It
should be obvious that they cannot at once repudiate their obligation under
the warranty and assert its provisions beneficial to them.'182
In reaching its conclusion, the court regarded itself as bound by an
Illinois intermediate appellate level decision'8 3 which apparently held
that the failure of a limited remedy under Section 2-719(2) automati-
cally invalidated a separate consequential damage disclaimer. None-
theless, the language quoted above demonstrates that the court's
conclusion was based largely on the seller's misconduct subsequent to
contracting. To add to confusion, the court went on to hold that,
although the consequential damage disclaimer was invalid, it was not
unconscionable. The court rejected the buyer's argument that the
seller's misconduct in refusing to honor the agreed remedy would
cause the consequential damage disclaimer to operate in an uncon-
181. 517 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. IM. 1981).
182. rd. at 897 (quoting Adams v. J.L Case Co., 125 Ill. App. 2d 388,402-03,261 N.E.2d 1,
7-8 (1970)).
183. Adams v. J.I. Case Co., 125 111. App. 2d 388, 261 N.E.2d 1 (1970).
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scionable manner. Instead, the court reasoned that unconscionability
was to be judged only under Section 2-302 in terms of "the relative
bargaining positions of the parties and the consequences of those rela-
tive strengths when the contract was entered into."184 This reasoning
is hard to follow because the court based its holding regarding the con-
sequential damage disclaimer primarily on the seller's misconduct.
Further, since the two "giant" corporations involved in the litigation
were no doubt bargaining at arms' length at the time of contracting, an
analysis of unconscionability under Section 2-302 certainly would re-
quire a finding that the clause was not unconscionable at its inception.
Under the court's view, a consequential damage provision apparently
cannot be rendered unconscionable no matter how egregious the con-
duct of the seller subsequent to contracting.
The proper application of intervening unconscionability under Sec-
tion 2-719(3) in a willful breach case is demonstrated by Select Pork,
Inc. v. Babcock Swine, Inc.'8 5 The contracts involved in the case were
for the sale of two specific breeds of pigs and included particularized
express warranties regarding the animals. The contracts also con-
tained a clause limiting the buyers' remedy to the amount of the
purchase price and an exclusion of consequential damages. The seller
knowingly delivered pigs that were not of the type or quality war-
ranted. When these pigs developed diseases and other problems, the
buyers investigated and discovered that the pigs were not of the blood
lines promised. The buyers then brought an action for breach of war-
ranty and recovered in excess of $500,000.
On appeal, the seller asserted that the trial court erred in allowing
consequential damages because of the exclusion clause in the contract.
The Eighth Circuit upheld the verdict, reasoning that the trial court
properly found the consequential damages clause to be unconsciona-
ble. The court reasoned:
Had Babcock delivered the promised Midwestern Gilts and Meatline Boars,
then the clause limiting damages to return of the purchase price would have
been reasonable. As events developed, however, the very special pigs prom-
ised by Babcock were never delivered. Babcock knew the pigs were not the
type promised; plaintiffs did not. The failure to deliver Midwestern Gilts is
the heart of this case. Under the circumstances, fairness and the Uniform
Commercial Code do not require that plaintiffs be held to a remedial limita-
tion which they thought would be applicable to the Midwestern Gilts which
they agreed to buy. Having failed to deliver the highly-touted special pigs,
defendants may not now assert a favorable clause to limit their liability.1 8 6
Intervening circumstances subsequent to contracting had rendered
the consequential damage disclaimer unconscionable. Although the
case did not involve a willful refusal to honor a limited remedy, it is
184. KKO, Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 892, 899 (N.D. M1l. 1981).
185. 640 F.2d 147 (8th Cir. 1981).
186. I& at 149-50.
[Vol. 67:548
LIMITATIONS ON REMEDIES
indistinguishable from such a case. There is no meaningful difference
between a seller's willful refusal to repair goods to meet the contract
description and his willful failure to provide such goods in the first
place.1 8 7
c. "Interening" Unconscionzbility
The conclusion should not be reached that the seller's good faith
but unsuccessful efforts to honor the agreed remedy always will result
in the consequential damages disclaimer being upheld. Recent cases
have emphasized that the question of unconscionability under Section
2-719(3) is to be assessed independently in terms of intervening facts
and circumstances that have occurred subsequent to contracting so
that the clause limiting or excluding consequential damages not be al-
lowed to "operate in an unconscionable manner."1 8 8 Once the agreed
remedy is found to have failed of its essential purpose under Section 2-
719(2), these cases usually proceed on the basis of a four-fold
analysis.18 9
First, the court examines the situation at the time of contracting-
the bargaining context-to determine whether the agreement is un-
conscionable in the Section 2-302 sense. Second, if the provision passes
muster under Section 2-302, the court determines the intent of the
parties with respect to the provision excluding or limiting consequen-
tial damages. The issue here is whether the provision is to be given
effect independent of the consequences resulting from the failure of
the agreed remedy under Section 2-719(2). Most often the conclusion
is that the warranty, remedy limitation, and consequential damage ex-
clusion were intended as a mutually interdependent package. The ex-
ception is cases involving especially complex, experimental, or
prototype goods or goods made to the buyer's specifications.190 Third,
if the consequential damage disclaimer is found to be part of an inter-
dependent package, the next question is whether the failure of the
agreed remedy caused the buyer to suffer consequential damages be-
yond those contemplated by the parties at the time of contracting.
This test will not be satisfied, of course, if the loss is properly attribu-
187. See also Hydraform Prod. Corp. v. American Steel & Aluminum Corp., 127 N.H.
187, 498 A.2d 339 (1985)(court finds no unconscionability under Section 2-302 but
awards the buyer consequential damages upon a finding that the limited replace-
ment warranty failed of its essential purpose due to the seller's defective and
tardy replacements).
188. U.C.C. § 2-719 comment 3 (1978).
189. See Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Silas Corp. of America, 761 F.2d 553 (9th Cir.
1985); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir.
1980); S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978); Custom
Automated Mach. v. Penda Corp., 537 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. 1. 1982); Polycon Indus.
v. Hercules, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Wis. 1979).
190. See supm notes 137-44.
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table in some way to the fault of the buyer.191 Fourth, if the buyer has
suffered consequential loss beyond that contemplated by the parties,
the final question is whether that event will make unconscionable the
enforcement of the provision limiting or excluding liability for the
IoSS.19 2
A watershed case for this intervening unconscionability approach
is S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith International, Inc.193 In S.M. Wilson,
the seller made good faith efforts to repair, and its conduct was not in
any way wrongful or dilatory. Nevertheless, the efforts to repair the
goods were unsuccessful. Although the court found that the limited
remedy had failed of its essential purpose, the court denied the buyer
recovery of consequential damages. The contract had a separate provi-
sion excluding such liability, and the court held that it should be en-
forced notwithstanding the failure of the limited remedy. The court
held:
Parties of relatively equal bargaining power negotiated an allocation of their
risks of loss. Consequential damages were assigned to the buyer, Wilson. The
machine was a complex piece of equipment designed for the buyer's purposes.
The seller Smith did not ignore his obligation to repair, he simply was unable
to perform it. This is not enough to require that the seller absorb losses the
buyer plainly agreed to bear. Risk shifting is socially expensive and should
not be undertaken in the absence of a good reason. An even better reason is
required when to so shift is contrary to a contract freely negotiated. The de-
fault of the seller is not so total and fundamental as to require that its conse-
quential damage limitation be expunged from the contract.1 9 4
This language is significant in a number of respects. First, the
court distinguished a situation in which the seller ignores his obliga-
tion under the limited remedy from a situation in which the seller
tries but is simply unable to perform. The court almost certainly
would have invalidated the consequential damages disclaimer had the
191. See, e.g., AES Technology Sys., Inc. v. Coherent Radiation, 583 F.2d 933 (7th Cir.
1978)(buyer failed to mitigate damages that could have been reasonably avoided);
Argo Welded Prod., Inc. v. J.T. Ryerson Steel & Sons, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 583 (E.D.
Pa. 1981) (buyer refused seller's offer to replace); Atlantic Bldg. Sys., Inc. v. Alley
Constr. Corp., 32 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1414 (D. Mass. 1981)(buyer waited
over a year after defect was discovered to notify seller).
192. Some courts expressly reject the "intervening unconscionability" approach. See
Phillips Mach. Co. v. LeBlond, Inc., 494 F. Supp. 318, 324 (N.D. Okla. 1980)("Sub-
sequent events will not make a valid provision unconscionable"); Tacoma
Boatbuilding Co. v. Delta Fishing Co., 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 26, 33
(W.D. Wash. 1980)("Unconscionability under the Code, however, focuses upon
the inception and not the outcome of the contract"). O. Industralease Auto-
mated & Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enters., 58 A.D.2d 482, 490, 396
N.Y.S.2d 427, 432 (1977)(invalidating a warranty disclaimer on the basis of inter-
vening unconscionability: "Although the statute prescribes that we are to deter-
mine unconscionability as of the time of the making of the contract (U.C.C., § 2-
302), we cannot divorce entirely the events which occur later").
193. 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978).
194. L at 1375.
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seller's conduct caused the remedy limitation to fail.195 Second, the
court did not limit assessment of unconscionability to facts and cir-
cumstances at the time of contracting. Finally, the court did limit its
holding validating the provision to the facts of the case and empha-
sized that "each case must stand on its own facts." 9 6
In a subsequent decision, the court expanded on its analysis in S.M.
Wilson by emphasizing that, even though a consequential damages ex-
cluder may not have been unconscionable when the contract was en-
tered into, it may become unconscionable when the limited remedy
fails of its essential purpose.197 The court again noted that each case
must be decided on its own facts to determine whether the exclusive
remedy and the excluder were intended by the parties to operate as
separable elements of risk allocation or as inseparable parts of a com-
prehensive risk allocation package.
Subsequent to S.M. Wilson, a number of courts adopted this inter-
vening unconscionability approach to evaluating provisions excluding
or limiting consequential damages under Section 2-719(3).198 For ex-
ample, in Chatlos Systems, Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp.,'99 the
court upheld the exclusion of consequential damages even though the
limited repair or replacement remedy had failed of its essential pur-
pose. Nevertheless, the court held:
The repair remedy's failure of essential purpose, while a discreet question, is
not completely irrelevant to the issue of the conscionability of enforcing the
consequential damages exclusion. The latter term is 'merely an allocation of
unknown or undeterminable risks' [quoting Comment 3 to Section 2-719].
Recognizing this, the question here narrows to the unconscionability of the
buyer retaining the risk of consequential damages upon the failure of the es-
sential purpose of the exclusive repair remedy.2 0 0
The buyer had purchased a computer system from NCR.201 The con-
tract contained a limited repair remedy and a separate clause exclud-
ing consequential damages. Despite continued efforts on the part of
NCR's programmers, the system was never able to deliver all its
195. Other courts are more specific and actually state that the bad faith or willfully
dilatory conduct on the part of the seller is a material factor in analyzing whether
the consequential damage exclusion will survive despite failure of the limited
remedy. See, ag., Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95 A.D.2d 5,
465 N.Y.S.2d 606 (1983).
196. S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363, 1376 (9th Cir. 1978).
197. Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Silas Corp. of America, 761 F.2d 553 (9th Cir. 1985).
198. See, e-g., RRX Indus. v. Lab-Con, Inc., 772 F.2d 543 (9th Cir. 1985); Fiorito Bros. v.
Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984); Transamerica Oil Corp. v. Lynes,
Inc., 723 F.2d 758 (10th Cir. 1983); Lewis Refrigeration Co. v. Sawyer Fruit, Vege-
table & Cold Storage Co., 709 F.2d 427 (6th Cir. 1983); Chatlos Sys., Inc. v. Na-
tional Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980).
199. 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980).
200. Id at 1086-87.
201. Chatlos actually entered into a lease arrangement with NCR but the court ruled
that the lease was a sale of goods within the meaning of Article 2. Id at 1083-84.
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promised functions, all of which were crucial to the buyer's accounting
and inventory process. The court ruled that the seller's delay in cor-
recting the system's deficiencies caused the limited remedy to fail of
its essential purpose. This finding, however, did not automatically re-
sult in the invalidation of the damages excluder. While acknowledg-
ing that case law existed on both sides of the issue, the court stated its
belief that the better reasoned approach was to treat the consequential
damage exclusion as "an independent provision, valid unless
unconscionable." 202
In examining the circumstances of the case to determine the con-
scionability of the consequential damage disclaimer, the court found
several factors relevant to its determination. Among these were the
relative parity in the parties' bargaining power, the complexity of the
equipment (such that the buyer would have had some appreciation of
the problems that might be encountered), the clarity of the exclusion
provision, and the fact that the buyer was a sophisticated commercial
entity rather than a consumer. Based on these factors, all of which
existed at the inception of the contract, the court found that the par-
ties had effectively allocated the risk of consequential damages to the
buyer.
The court then turned its analysis to post-contract events. In this
regard, the court emphasized the foreseeability of the problems that
eventually arose in the system and the good faith efforts on the part of
the seller to correct the defects. The court distinguished the case from
one in which the seller did not act reasonably or acted in bad faith
with respect to repair attempts. Most importantly, the court found
that the consequential damages suffered by the buyer were not unrea-
sonably large but "came within the realm of expectable losses." 2 03 Ac-
cordingly, enforcement of the provision excluding liability for
consequential damages would not cause it to operate in an unconscion-
able manner.2 04
In Chatlos, the Third Circuit was applying New Jersey law and, the
case being one of first impression, was forced to predict how a New
Jersey court would rule on the matter. The court's prediction was re-
cently proved accurate when the New Jersey Supreme Court relied
upon the Chatlos decision and its "intervening unconscionability"
analysis to uphold a consequential damage disclaimer even though the
limited remedy of repair or replacement was found to have failed of its
202. Id at 1086.
203. Id at 1087.
204. Thus, unconscionability was not found under the fourth, and perhaps the third,
factors discussed above. However, sympathy for the buyer might be undue. Ulti-
mately the buyer recovered approximately $200,000 (almost five times the
purchase price of the computer) as general damages under Section 2-714. Chatlos
Sys., Inc. v. National Cash Register Corp., 670 F.2d 1304 (3d Cir. 1982).
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essential purpose. The court emphasized that subsequent events could
render such an excluder unconscionable even though the clause was in
no way tainted at the time of the making of the contract. The court
said:
Accordingly, we conclude that [Section 2-719] does not require the invalidation
of an exclusion of consequential damages when limited contractual remedies
fail of their essential purpose. It is only when the circumstances of the trans-
action, including the seller's breach, cause the consequential damage exclusion
to be inconsistence [sic] with the intent and reasonable commercial expecta-
tion of the parties that invalidation of the exclusionary clause would be appro-
priate under the Code. For example, although a buyer may agree to the
exclusion of consequential damages, a seller's wrongful repudiation of a repair
warranty may expose a buyer to consequential damages not contemplated by
the contract, and other Code remedies may be inadequate. In such circum-
stances, a court might appropriately decline to enforce the exclusion.2 0 5
Crucial to a determination of intervening unconscionability under
Section 2-719(3) is whether the exclusive remedy and consequential
damages exclusion provisions were intended by the parties to operate
as "'separable elements of risk allocation' or as inseparable parts of a
comprehensive risk allocation package."2 06 An excellent case on point
is Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp.207 In Fiorito, the buyer, a construc-
tion company, contracted with the seller for the purchase of thirteen
dump truck bodies. The contract limited the buyer's remedy to repair
or replacement and specifically excluded liability for consequential
damages. Defects in the bodies became apparent after installation
onto the trucks. The buyer notified the seller of the defects but re-
ceived no response. When a service manager of the seller finally ex-
amined them he opined that the bodies were not covered under the
contract warranty. Further attempts to persuade the seller to repair
were unsuccessful, and the buyer itself began repair of the bodies.
At trial, the court found that the facts showed a "'callous disre-
gard' "by the seller" 'for the purposes for which the exclusive repair-
or-replacement remedy was designed-to insure that [the buyer]
would acquire defect-free trucks.' "208 The court concluded that the
remedy limitation had failed of its essential purpose. The court also
awarded consequential damages to the buyer despite the separate ex-
cluder in the contract. On appeal, the following reasoning of the trial
court was quoted with approval:
'[The approach] that the Washington courts can be expected to follow, is to
examine individually the provisions of each contract to ascertain the intent of
205. Kearney & Trecker Corp. v. Master Engraving Co., 107 N.J. 584, 527 A.2d 429
(1987).
206. Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Silas Corp. of America, 761 F.2d 553, 556 (9th Cir.
1985)(quoting Fiorito Bros. v. Fruehauf Corp., 747 F.2d 1309, 1315 (9th Cir.
1984)(quoting the district court opinion)).
207. 747 F.2d 1309 (9th Cir. 1984).
208. Id at 1312 (quoting the trial court).
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the parties. Under the circumstances of each contract, are the exclusive-rem-
edy and damage-exclusion terms separable elements of risk-allocation....
[sic][o]r are they inseparable parts of a unitary package of risk allocation? In
the current case, it does not make sense to view the exclusive-remedy and
consequential-damage provisions independently. The purpose of the parties in
agreeing to this exclusive remedy provision was to [i]nsure that the Plaintiff
would not suffer from down time and other such consequential harms that
follow from defective conditions in the trucks.... It cannot be maintained
that it was the parties' intention that Defendant be enabled to avoid all conse-
quential liability for breach by first agreeing to an alternative remedy provi-
sion designed to avoid consequential harms, and then scuttling that
alternative remedy through its recalcitrance in honoring the agreement.'20 9
While most courts have not so clearly articulated this causation factor
and its effect on the bargained risk allocation of the parties when de-
termining the existence of intervening unconscionability under Sec-
tion 2-719(3), the more recent decisions at least reflect an implicit
consideration of such cause and effect.2 10
d. Latent Defect Cases
If on the particular facts the court finds the seller should assume
liability for latent defects in goods, and such defects appear subse-
quent to contracting, then arguably it would be unconscionable to
leave on the buyer losses attributable to such defects. A contract pro-
vision which operates to charge the buyer with the losses might be
stricken as unconscionable. Courts have long invalidated such provi-
sions.21 1 This was the result reached by the New York Court of Ap-
peals in the well-known case, Wilson Trading Corp. v. David
Ferguson, Ltd.212
Similarly, in another case the court, on appeal, reversed the trial
court's denial of consequential damages to the buyer. The buyer had
purchased material for the express purpose of processing it into a par-
ticular type of window shade. The seller knew of the buyer's plans
and expressly warranted that the fabric was suitable for that purpose.
The invoice for the goods contained a provision barring claims after
the goods had been cut. During processing, the buyer discovered that
the goods were defective and unsuitable for the planned window
shades. The seller refused to replace the goods. In finding for the
209. Id. at 1315 (quoting the trial court).
210. See Milgard Tempering, Inc. v. Silas Corp. of America, 761 F.2d 553 (9th Cir.
1985); Chatlos Sys. v. National Cash Register Corp., 635 F.2d 1081 (3d Cir. 1980);
S.M. Wilson & Co. v. Smith Int'l, Inc., 587 F.2d 1363 (9th Cir. 1978); Custom Auto-
mated Mach. v. Penda Corp., 537 F. Supp. 77 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Polycon Indus. v.
Hercules, Inc., 471 F. Supp. 1316 (E.D. Wis. 1979); Industralease Automated &
Scientific Equip. Corp. v. R.M.E. Enters., 58 A.D.2d 482, 396 N.Y.S.2d 427 (1977).
211. See Randy Knitwear, Inc. v. American Cyanamid Co., 11 N.Y.2d 5,181 N.E.2d 399,
266 N.Y.S.2d 363 (1962); Kansas City Wholesale Grocery Co. v. Weber Packing
Corp., 93 Utah 414, 73 P.2d 1272 (1937).
212. 23 N.Y.2d 398, 244 N.E.2d 685, 297 N.Y.S.2d 108 (1968).
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buyer, the court invalidated the limitation clause, finding that it would
operate to deny the buyer any remedy at all.2 13
It is unclear, however, whether the courts in these two cases would
have reached similar results regarding a recovery of consequential
damages had the contracts contained a separate clause insulating the
seller from such liability.
It is quite common for courts, particularly in farming states, to in-
validate remedy limitations and damage excluders in contracts involv-
ing sales to farmers of herbicides214 or seed215 which manifest latent
defects subsequent to sale. Such decisions usually rest on a deep-
rooted local public policy favoring extraordinary protection to the
farming industry. In such cases, however, the contractual provision is
perhaps best understood as invalid ab initio under Section 2-719(1)
rather than because of intervening circumstances under Section 2-
719(3).
C. Where No Independent Contract Provision Excludes
Consequential Damages
In cases in which an agreed remedy limitation is found to have
failed of its essential purpose, the seller may be held responsible for
consequential losses of the buyer if there is no separate contractual
provision limiting or excluding such damages. The cases uniformly so
hold.216 This is true even though the intent of the parties may have
been for the exclusive remedy to protect the seller from liability for
consequential damages. The efficacy of the limited remedy will be
judged under Section 2-719(2). If it is stricken thereunder, then noth-
ing in the contract remains to protect the seller from liability for the
buyer's consequential losses. Only by putting in the agreement a sepa-
rate provision limiting or excluding consequential damages can the
seller shelter under the protection afforded by the unconscionability
standard of Section 2-719(3).
213. Trinkle v. Schumacher Co., 100 Wis. 2d 13, 18-20, 301 N.W.2d 255,258-59 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1980).
214. See Durham v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 315 N.W.2d 696 (S.D. 1982). But see Feeders,
Inc. v. Monsanto Co., 33 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 541 (D. Minn. 1981);
Kieven v. Geigy Agric. Chem., 303 Minn. 320, 227 N.W.2d 566 (1975).
215. See Dessert Seed Co. v. Drew Farmers Supply, 248 Ark. 858, 454 S.W.2d 307
(1970). But see Pennington Grain & Seed, Inc. v. Tuten, 422 So. 2d 948 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982).
216. Coastal Modular Corp. v. Laminators, Inc., 635 F.2d 1102 (4th Cir. 1980); Beal v.
General Motors Corp., 354 F. Supp 423 (D. Del. 1973); Neville Chem. Co. v. Union
Carbide Corp., 294 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. Pa. 1968), qff'd in part, rev'd in part, 422
F.2d 1205 (3d Cir. 1970), cert denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970); Reynolds v. Preferred
Mut. Ins. Co., 11 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 701 (Mass. Dist. Ct. 1972); Devore
v. Bostrom, 632 P.2d 832 (Utah 1981).
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V. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Personal Injuries in Consumer Cases
As a practical matter, it is virtually impossible for a seller, by
agreement, to disclaim liability for personal injuries resulting from
the sale of consumer goods. Even if the attempt would be successful
for breach of warranty, the seller probably would be vulnerable to a
strict liability claim.
Section 2-719(3) creates a presumption against the validity of agree-
ments excluding or limiting liability for personal injuries. It provides:
"Limitation of consequential damages for injury to the person in the
case of consumer goods is prima facie unconscionable but limitation of
damages where the loss is commercial is not."217 It has been said that
this provision merely allocates the burden of proof. The seller of con-
sumer goods would have the burden of proving the validity of a clause
limiting or excluding liability for personal injuries, whereas the buyer
would have the burden of proving invalidity in cases involving other
goods or other types of consequential loss. 2 1 8
No case to date has enforced a contractual provision so as to protect
a seller from liability for personal injuries. The lesson is that sellers
will find it almost impossible to overcome the presumption against va-
lidity. For example, in one case involving the sale of new automobile
tires, the buyer suffered fatal injuries when one of the tires failed,
causing his station wagon to go out of control and roll over. The tire's
failure was evidently caused by a road hazard and not by any defect in
the tire. All expert testimony at trial was to the effect that there was
no defect in the tire. In addition to a guarantee that the tire would be
free from defects for the life of the original tread, the manufacturer's
warranty also provided a road hazard guarantee for the same period
against any injury to the tire. The warranty package clearly provided
that the guarantee did not cover consequential damages, but limited
liability merely to repairing or replacing the tire.
At trial, the personal representative recovered a verdict of $125,000
for the buyer's personal injuries. This verdict was affirmed on appeal.
The manufacturer argued that the clause excluding liability for per-
sonal injuries should have been upheld. The manufacturer empha-
sized that the personal injuries did not result from any defect in the
tire, thus barring any action for strict liability. The buyer's only action
was for breach of the road hazard warranty, a warranty that provided
the buyer more protection than the law required. In such a case, the
manufacturer argued, the presumption against the validity of the con-
217. U.C.C. § 2-719(3) (1978).
218. Royal Indem. Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 385 F. Supp. 520 (S.D.N.Y. 1974);
Tuttle v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 585 P.2d 1116 (Okla. 1978). See also KKO,
Inc. v. Honeywell, Inc., 517 F. Supp. 892 (N.D. Ill. 1981).
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sequential damage excluder should be found to have been overcome.
Over a vigorous dissenting opinion which agreed with the seller, the
court rejected this position as "not consonant with the commercial and
human realities."219
In justifying its decision, the court emphasized the manufacturer's
public advertising regarding the life-saving capabilities of the tire.
The court reasoned that the buyer was "far more likely to have made
the purchase decision in order to protect himself and the passengers in
his car from death or personal injury in a blowout accident than to
assure himself of a refund of the price of the tire in such an event."220
Thus, it would be unconscionable to frustrate these reasonable expec-
tations of the buyer by permitting the manufacturer to limit its liabil-
ity for personal injuries.22 ' The unhappy result of the case is that road
hazard guarantees for automobile tires soon disappeared from the
marketplace, and the lesson is that the presumption in Section 2-
719(3) is almost irrebuttable in personal injury cases.
In another tire case, the court sought to explain the reasoning for
holding a seller liable for personal injuries even when such injuries
are not shown to be the result of a defect in the goods. The court said
that the explanation rested on a public policy of consumer protection.
The court stated: "In the case of consumer goods to give what looks
like relief in the form of an express warranty, but is not, is uncon-
scionable as a surprise limitation and therefore against public policy."
The court opined that the seller or manufacturer might avoid such
"surprise" by not making a road hazard guarantee but by stating that
"he does not guarantee the tire will not blow out, but if it does he
promises to replace it." '222
It is unlikely that the courts will ever hold that a contractual provi-
sion in and of itself will insulate a seller from liability for personal
injuries. In order for the seller to carry his burden with respect to the
efficacy of such a clause, other factors would have to be present to
demonstrate clearly the fairness in allocating the risk to the buyer.
One such case might involve the sale of high-risk, experimental goods
sold only after the buyer has received careful warning from the seller.
Although the presumption in Section 2-719(3) only applies to per-
sonal injuries arising from "consumer goods," the courts will readily
allow evidence of unconscionability in cases of personal injuries
caused by other types of goods. 223 In one interesting case, a personal
injury action was brought by the decedent's administratrix against
219. Collins v. Uniroyal, Inc., 64 N.J. 260, 315 A.2d 16 (1974)(per curiam).
220. Id at 263, 315 A.2d at 18.
221. Id
222. Tuttle v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 585 P.2d 1116, 1120 (Okla. 1978).
223. See Morrow v. New Moon Homes, Inc., 548 P.2d 279 (Alaska 1976). See also
Schlenz v. John Deere Co., 31 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) 1020 (D. Mont. 1981).
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both the automobile dealer and the manufacturer for the death of the
decedent resulting from injuries received when a wheel on the truck
purchased from the dealer collapsed and caused the truck to overturn.
The court allowed recovery against the dealer despite a warranty pro-
vision which limited its liability to repair or replacement of defective
parts. The court then allowed recovery for the dealer against the
manufacturer. The manufacturer defended that its agreement with
the dealer protected it from liability for consequential damages and
that the presumption in Section 2-719(3) only protected consumers.
The court nevertheless concluded that it would clearly be uncon-
scionable to allow the manufacturer to escape liability. The court em-
phasized that the dealer was a mere conduit between the
manufacturer and the ultimate consumer and that the defect in the
wheel was latent and one which the dealer had no notice or know-
ledge. The court said that Section 2-719(3) need not be read only to
protect consumers. 224 The court's conclusion appears correct. The
presumption in Section 2-719(3) applies to "consumer goods," not
merely to consumers.
Section 2-719(3) makes a distinction between personal injury and
commercial loss. The presumption of unconscionability applies only
to the former, and the courts generally adhere to this distinction.225
Nevertheless, a seller is well advised to draft the agreement to make
clear that no exclusion of, or limitation on, personal injuries is in-
tended. For example, in yet another automobile tire case, the agree-
ment excluded liability "for any consequential damage."226 In an
action by the buyer and her husband for personal injuries and prop-
erty damage resulting from a blowout of one of the tires, the court
allowed recovery for both types of consequential loss. The court rea-
soned that, although there was no presumption of unconscionability in
Section 2-719(3) with respect to property damage, the agreement,
which attempted to exclude liability for both personal injury and
property damage, was so tainted with unconscionability as to be
stricken entirely.2 27
It should be emphasized that the Code makes no presumption of
unconscionability with respect to a disclaimer of warranty as opposed
to a limitation of remedy. Thus, even if a consumer suffers personal
injuries caused by the goods, he either must proceed under strict lia-
224. Ford Motor Co. v. Tritt, 244 Ark. 883, 890, 430 S.W.2d 778, 782 (1968).
225. See Gladden v. Cadillac Motor Car Div., 83 N.J. 320, 416 A.2d 394 (1980); Lobianco
v. Property Protection, Inc., 292 Pa. Super. 346, 437 A.2d 417 (1981).
226. McCarty v. E. J. Korvette, Inc., 28 Md. App. 421, 423, 347 A.2d 253, 256 (1975).
227. See McCarty v. E. J. Korvette, Inc., 28 Md. App. 421, 431, 347 A.2d 253, 260-61
(1975). See also Fischer v. General Elec. Hotpoint, 108 Misc. 2d 683, 438 N.Y.S.2d
690 (Civ. Ct. 1981)(property damage recovery allowed in consumer case in which
clause excluding liability for consequential damages found to be unconscionable
result of disparity in bargaining power).
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bility or have a warranty upon which to base his claim.228 Of course,
the warranty peg usually will be supplied by the seller's express war-
ranty that the goods will be free from defects for a certain period of
time or amount of usage.2 2 9 Further, the Magnuson-Moss Act, which
prohibits disclaimers of implied warranties in many consumer cases,
might operate to afford the consumer a warranty claim.230
B. Trade Usage and Course of Dealing
It seems that a remedy limitation may be supplied entirely by us-
age of trade231 or course of dealing232 even though the contract be-
tween the parties is silent regarding the matter.23 3 Section 2-719
states that the "agreement" may limit or alter both remedies and dam-
ages recoverable. 234 "Agreement" is defined by the Code to mean "the
bargain of the parties in fact as found in their language or by implica-
tion or from other circumstances including course of dealing or usage
of trade or course of performance." 23 5
In one case, for example, the goods were packaged with a state-
ment that defective goods would be replaced and that the goods were
sold without any other warranty. A defect in the goods caused the
buyer substantial consequential loss. At trial, the seller introduced ev-
idence of a usage of trade that replacement of defective goods was un-
derstood to be the exclusive remedy available to the buyer. The court
228. See Tuttle v. Kelly-Springfield Tire Co., 585 P.2d 1116 (Okla. 1978); Ford Motor
Co. v. Moulton, 511 S.W.2d 690 (Tenn. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 870 (1974).
229. See Matthews v. Ford Motor Co., 479 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1973). It should be noted
that a seller who makes a written warranty with respect to consumer goods is
prohibited by the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act from disclaiming any implied
warranties. See infra notes 240-50 and accompanying text.
230. See infra notes 240-50 and accompanying text.
231. According to Section 1-205(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code:
A usage of trade is any practice or method of dealing having such regu-
larity of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expecta-
tion that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question.
The existence and scope of such a usage are to be proved as facts. If it is
established that such a usage is embodied in a written trade code or simi-
lar writing the interpretation of the writing is for the court.
U.C.C. § 1-205(2) (1978).
232. According to Section 1-205(1) of the Uniform Commercial Code: "A course of
dealing is a sequence of previous conduct between the parties to a particular
transaction which is fairly to be regarded as establishing a common basis of un-
derstanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct." Id. § 1-205(1).
233. According to Section 1-205(3) of the Uniform Commercial Code: "A course of
dealing between parties and any usage of trade in the vocation or trade in which
they are engaged or of which they are or should be aware give particular meaning
to and supplement or qualify terms of an agreement." Id. § 1-205(3).
234. Id. § 2-719(1)(a).
235. Id. § 1-201(3). For a case in which the buyer alleged a repair remedy based on
both prior course of dealing and trade usage, see Gindy Mfg. Corp. v. Cardinale
Trucking Corp., 111 N.J. Super. 383, 268 A.2d 345 (1970).
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enforced this usage of trade even though the remedy was not ex-
pressly made exclusive as required by Section 2-719236 and even
though the buyer actually may not have read the remedy limitation
language which accompanied the goods. The court also opined that an
exclusion of consequential damages could result from a usage of trade
even though there was no express agreement between the parties.2m
In determining that a remedy limitation provision or a clause ex-
cluding or limiting liability for consequential damages is not uncon-
scionable, courts often have emphasized the fact that the parties had
dealt with each other on a similar basis on prior occasions238 or that
the custom in the trade was to deal on that basis.23 9 Such prior course
of dealing or usage of trade supports a finding that the buyer knew or
should have known of the contractual provision and of its conse-
quences regardless of whether the provision could be shown to be the
product of specific negotiation.
C. Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act
The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Commission Im-
provement Act2 4 O-may affect a seller's attempt to disclaim, limit, or
otherwise alter the Code's remedial scheme. The Act applies to many
consumer transactions but, interestingly enough, is not limited to
them. The Act governs "consumer products," which are defined to
include "any tangible personal property which is distributed in com-
merce and which is normally used for personal, family or household
purposes." 241 Thus, a sale of a household vacuum cleaner to a business
entity would be governed by the Act. However, the Federal Trade
Commission Regulations exclude "products which are purchased
solely for commercial or industrial use" from most of the Act's
236. See supra text accompanying notes 27-46.
237. Posttape Assocs. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 537 F.2d 751, 756 (3d Cir. 1976).
238. See Argo Welded Prod., Inc. v. J. T. Ryerson Steel & Sons, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 583
(E.D. Pa. 1981); Stanley A. Kopp, Inc. v. John Deere Co., 510 F. Supp. 807 (E.D.
Pa. 1981), aff'd, 676 F.2d 688 (3d Cir. 1981); Boone Valley Coop. Processing Ass'n
v. French Oil Mill Mach. Co., 383 F. Supp. 606 (N.D. Iowa 1974); J. D. Pavlak, Ltd.
v. William Davies Co., 40 Ill. App. 3d 1, 351 N.E.2d 243 (1976); Kansas City Struc-
tural Steel Co. v. L. G. Barcus & Sons, Inc., 217 Kan. 88, 535 P.2d 419 (1975);
Cayuga Harvester, Inc. v. Allis-Chalmers Corp., 95 A.D.2d 5, 465 N.Y.S.2d 606
(1983); D. 0. V. Graphics, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 46 Ohio Misc. 37, 75 Ohio
Op. 2d 349, 347 N.E.2d 561 (Ct. C.P., Hamilton County 1976). But see Trinkle v.
Schumacher Co., 100 Wis. 2d 13, 301 N.W.2d 255 (Ct. App. 1980)(provision pre-
cluding damages held unconscionable because of latent defect although similar
prior dealings between parties had occurred).
239. See Tacoma Boatbuilding Co. v. Delta Fishing Co., 28 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Calla-
ghan) 26 (W.D. Wash. 1980); Architectural Aluminum Corp. v. Macarr, Inc., 70
Misc. 2d 495, 333 N.Y.S.2d 818 (Sup. Ct. 1972).
240. 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (Supp. V 1982).
241. 15 U.S.C. § 2301(1) (Supp. V 1982).
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provisions.=
Under the Mangnuson-Moss Act there is no requirement that sell-
ers warrant their products in writing or otherwise. If a consumer
product costing more than $10 is warranted in writing, however, the
warranty must be designated as either "full" or "limited." To qualify
as a "full" warranty, four standards must be met: (1) the minimum
remedy given by a warrantor must be to repair or otherwise correct
any defect or other failure of the product to conform to the warranty;
(2) no limitation can be placed on the duration of any implied war-
ranty on the product; (3) any exclusion or limitation of consequential
damages must appear conspicuously on the face of the warranty; (4) if
the warrantor is unsuccessful in remedying a defect after a reasonable
number of attempts, the consumer must be allowed to elect either a
refund of the purchase price or a replacement of the product.243
Perhaps most provocatively, the Act disallows a warrantor who ex-
tends a written warranty to disclaim any implied warranties.24 4 Nev-
ertheless, if only a "limited" warranty is given, the duration of implied
warranties can be limited to that of the express warranty.2 45 If a "lim-
ited" warranty is given, the Federal Trade Commission Regulations
further require that any limitation or exclusion of consequential dam-
ages be conspicuously stated.2 46
One obvious effect of the Act and its regulations on the require-
ments of Section 2-19 of the Code is to require all provisions exclud-
ing liability for consequential damages to be conspicuous in the
writing, regardless of whether a "full" or "limited" warranty is in-
volved. If the Act applies, a consequential damage excluder is invalid
if it is not conspicuously stated despite the fact that it would not be
found to be unconscionable.
The Act also guarantees the buyer a minimum remedy of repair of
defects in the goods. This guarantee probably allows no more than
does Section 2-719.247
The Act provides in the case of a "full" warranty that the buyer
may elect either a refund of the purchase price or a replacement of the
product if the seller is unable to repair defects in the goods after a
reasonable number of opportunities to do so.248 This provision should
not be read to restrict in any way the right of the buyer to recover
damages or to avail himself of any other remedy under the Code.249
242. 16 C.F.R. § 701.1(b) (1988).
243. 15 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(1)-(4) (Supp. V 1982).
244. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(a) (Supp. V 1982).
245. 15 U.S.C. § 2308(b) (Supp. V 1982).
246. 16 C.F.R. § 702.3(a)(8) (1988).
247. See supra text accompanying notes 13-26.
248. See generally supra text accompanying notes 105-14.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 55-114.
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The Act subjects itself to state law to the extent such law provides the
buyer greater remedy.250
VI. CONCLUSION
In sum, Section 2-719 remains one of the most litigated provisions
of the Uniform Commercial Code. However, with each passing set of
advance sheets, the case law encrustation on this ethereal provision
thickens, acting as a shield from further judicial analysis. With one
exception, in fact, it has been at least a decade since new concepts have
been brought to bear on analysis of the provision. This exception, the
concept of intervening unconscionability, represents an important tool
for dealing with the vexed question of the continued efficacy of an
excluder of consequential damages once a limited remedy to which it
is appended has been found to have failed of its essential purpose.
250. See 15 U.S.C. § 2311(b) (Supp. V 1982).
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